FINAL REPORT

EVALUATON OF THE JOINT PROGRAMMES ON GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

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ACRONYMS

BCC	Botswana Council of Churches
BMDGR	Botswana Millennium Development Goals Report
GBV	Gender Based Violence
CCG	Component Coordination Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAD	Gender Affairs Department
GEJGP	Global Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes
GJGP	Global Joint Gender Programme
GM	Gender Mainstreaming
GoB	Government of Botswana
GNI	Gross National Income
GoB-UN POP	Government of Botswana and United Nations Programme Operational Plan
HDI	Human Development Index
IP	Implementing Partner
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
JGP	Joint Gender Programme
JGPC	Joint Gender Programme Coordinator
TWG	Technical Working Group
MBGE	Men and Boys for Gender Equality
MIC	Middle Income Country
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD)
MNIGA	Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs
NEX	National Execution
NPGAD	National Policy on Gender and Development
Prodoc	Programme/Project Document
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
PUNO	Participating UN Organisations (PUNOs)
RBM	Results Based Management
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSI	Stepping Stones International
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNPOP	United Nations Programme Operational Plan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WID	Women in Development Policy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Joint Gender Programme (JGP) in Botswana has two programme components. One is "The United Nations Joint Programme of Support for Gender Mainstreaming in Botswana 2015-2016", henceforth the "mainstreaming component". The other is "The United Nations Joint Programme of Support to End Gender Based Violence in Botswana: 2015-2016", henceforth the "GBV component". The programme was funded to the tune of US$841, 200: US$336, 200 for the mainstreaming component and US$505, 000 for the GBV component.

Developed in the context of a global agenda for UN Reform focussed on development

PROGRAMME THEORY OF CHANGE

The programme's theory of change revolves around three mutually supportive drivers of change: *a conducive regulatory framework*, *institutional capacity,* and *knowledge and evidence*. Within this framework, UN agencies, the Government of Botswana (GoB) and partner Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) will implement activities in five mutually supportive strategic areas: (a) review of policies and laws, (b) mainstreaming gender into development processes, (c) strengthening the delivery capacities of institutions and service providers, (d) strengthening monitoring and evaluation systems, and (e) advocacy and research.

a) *Conducive regulatory environment*: Gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls, and ending GBV require policies and laws that will help transform Botswana's culture of patriarchy and facilitate equality of opportunity for men and women, and boys and girls, empower women and girls, and guarantee their freedom from gender based discrimination. Good laws and policies can simultaneously empower duty bearers to overcome entrenched patriarchal barriers to gender equality and empower rights holders to claim their rights to equitable access to opportunities and freedom from discrimination based on gender.

effectiveness, and as a response to government demand for support, the JGP was motivated by several factors, key amongst them: (a) raising the impact of the UN's work on gender by pooling resources and working together to reduce transaction costs, achieve synergy and coherence, and raise efficiency; (b) speaking with one magnified voice to raise the profile of gender and (c) mobilising resources and partnerships for gender related work. It sought to contribute 21 outputs to three outcomes of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2010-2016. These results are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 of this report.

b) *Institutional capacity*: Under what programme documents call "partnerships", the JGP focusses on "…capacity building across a wide range of stakeholders" (*op cit*). In principle, activities that support outputs in this outcome area would not only target the agency of individual organisations but would also seek to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination in order to build synergies and amplify the collective impact of stakeholders' work on gender.

c) *Knowledge and evidence*: Robust data and analysis are necessary for transformative work on gender, whether it targets policy, legislative or institutional reforms, the behaviour of individuals and institutions, or informs planning, programming and advocacy. The nature, extent and impact of structural constraints on transformation for gender equality and the elimination of GBV must be known, analysed, documented and availed to rights holders and duty bearers alike if these constraints are to be overcome. Thus, knowledge and evidence are important drivers of transformational change for gender equality and the elimination of GBV.

The successful delivery of outputs under these result areas will contribute to two outcomes that are essential for progressive gender related transformation. One is *effective and efficient delivery of services on gender equality, the*

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empowerment of women and girls and the elimination of gender based violence. This is a rephrasing and refocussing on gender of UNDAF Outcome 1: "Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights". The achievement of this outcome will mean that duty bearers, i.e., institutions of service delivery and leaders, are competent to provide services that transform development outcomes and societal attitudes in favour of greater gender equality and justice and duty bearers have the competence to claim their rights.

The second outcome is *empowered children, youth, women, men, leaders and communities*. It is a rephrasing of UNDAF outcome 5: "Increased Child, Youth and Women empowerment and Participation at all levels by 2016". If service provision on gender is effective and efficient, rights holders are adequately empowered to claim their rights, and communities deal competently with gender issues, then gender equality and an end to gender based violence are more likely to be achieved.

KEY EVALUATION FINDINGS

a) JGP Results

The JGP achieved some consequential results over the two years it was implemented. Especially noteworthy are:

i) *The integration of gender into Vision 2036 and NDP 11*: This is a substantial achievement in the context of the JGP output "Government policies, planning and programming are gender mainstreamed". Due to their positions at the top of development planning, Vision 2036 and NDP 11 are strong entry points for integrating gender into development processes.

ii) *Development of the National Policy on Gender and Development (NPGAD)*: The JGP provided technical support to the development of the NPGAD and its related documents.

iii) *Capacity Building*: The programme provided capacity development services to several strategic institutions, including the National Gender Commission (orientation), the Gender

Affairs Department (GeAD) and several government ministries that received training on gender mainstreaming.

iv) *Research and advocacy:* The programme supported research on GBV and integrated HIV services. Notable results were also achieved on advocacy, especially through CSO partners. For instance, Men and Boys for Gender Equality used the media effectively to drive advocacy on male involvement in eradicating GBV and improving access to SRH services for men and boys. Gender Links' "I-stories", 'which document the experiences of victims of GBV, are tangible and powerful advocacy products.

The JGP has also shown that UN agencies can work together in the context of a JGP and achieve results. The One UN voice objective was achieved. The agencies shared resources, especially knowledge and technical expertise on gender that were largely limited to no more than two agencies. They put together an effective coordination function, which though under capacitated, managed the programme quite well, supporting IPs and reporting on programme performance. They also developed an active Technical Working Group (TWG) on gender.

Overall, the JGP's contributions fell short of the scale of ambition reflected in its key outputs. For instance, little progress was made in the key areas of surveillance and monitoring and evaluation, making national laws gender sensitive, and establishing national interest in research on GBV. Furthermore, whilst the independent actions of individual IPs resulted in significant contributions in their specific areas, their respective outputs were often not complementary enough to generate significant cumulative effects. For instance, the research work on GBV was an isolated activity with limited potential to generate national interest on gender. This suggests limited synergy and harmonisation amongst actual activity outputs despite the apparent synergy amongst planned outputs. The notable exception is the synergy CSO IPs achieved on advocacy, mostly leveraging the media platforms cultivated by MBGE.

b) Programme Design

The JGP was developed through a consultative process and was strongly aligned with national needs and priorities, the UNDAF and UN gender norms and standards. Even so, there is evidence that it had design problems that affected its performance. These are discussed in detail in section 2.2 of this report. In summary, they are:

(i) Under-investment in analysis, especially the systematic assessment of the capacities and readiness of GeAD as the fulcrum of the programme, and the readiness of participating UN agencies (PUNOs) to work together under a joint gender programme. In the final analysis, GeAD, as the national focal point on gender, was not able to provide the horizontal and vertical coordination necessary to achieve internal and external coherence.

(ii) Failure to reconcile the scale of the programme's ambition with the constraint imposed by resources at its disposal, which inevitably set it up for low achievement. The substantive outputs the JGP targeted require considerably more time, money and human resources than the JGP had.

(iii) Lack of focus, which limited the programme's capacity for impact. The JGP sought to do too much, too soon and with too little. Working on both gender mainstreaming and gender based violence was a big enough challenge on its own. Yet, the JGP sought to contribute to three fairly diverse UNDAF outcomes in these areas and within them 21 outputs, some of them quite broad. It also spread its limited resources across too many IPS. In the end, even the exceptional performance of individual IPs did not aggregate into achievement of substantive outputs.

(iv) Weak definition of results: The articulation of the JGP results did not quite follow the **SMART** – **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**chievable, **R**elevant and **T**ime-bound - rule. Several of them ran afoul of one or more of the SMART requirements, especially specificity and achievability.

(v) Inadequate profiling and mitigation of risks to the achievement of results. The design of the JGP simply did not factor in risks to the achievement of outputs. Consequently, even risks as basic as an inadequately capacitated GeAD or joint gender coordination function were not identified and mitigated.

As the report on the global evaluation joint gender programmes observes, "The design process - far more than the resulting artefact of the programme document - is the foundation of a programme's ability to deliver its results". The defects in the design of the JGP compromised its performance and prospects for realising the benefits of a joint gender programme.

c) Relevance

The JGP is an enormously relevant programme. In establishing the JGP, the UN was responding to government request for support, made at the ministerial level. The extent of the programme's relevance is discussed in detail in Section 4.1 of this report, where it is pointed out that the programme's relevance is strongly affirmed at five levels, namely: evident national need; national priorities as articulated in national plans, the national vision and national policies; the mandates of implementing partners; the UNDAF; and international norms and standards such as CEDAW, the MDGs and the SDGs. The joint programme approach also responds to the imperative for the UN to approach partners as one, reduce transaction costs and speak with one voice on gender. By most accounts, the JGP scores a perfect score on relevance.

d) Coherence Synergy and Efficiency

The JGP did achieve some measure of internal and external coherence. There is a logical connectedness between individual agency outputs, JGP outputs and JGP outcomes. These links are, however, often weakened by flaws in programme design. Especially problematic are the outcomes, which were borrowed verbatim from the UNDAF/UNPOP. These outcomes are too broad to provide the necessary specificity in relation to the outputs of the JGP. For instance,

Outcome 1, **"Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights"** is too broad to provide an efficient enough anchor for the JGP outputs. It lacks the specificity necessary to establish strong causality between the JGP outputs and the outcome they support. Yet the outputs themselves are generally mutually supportive.

The case for internal coherence and synergy is easier to make with regard to working arrangements. There is evidence that the limited expertise and experience on gender within the UN benefited all the participating UN organisations (PUNOs) and IPs and that individual agencies were often able to bring their respective strengths together for the benefit of the programme, especially funding and expertise. The UN was also able to build a strong and motivated Thematic Working Group on Gender that will serve programming on gender well in the future. NGOs were able to work together to expand the impact of their work, leveraging opportunities opened by others. For instance, several CSOs exploited the media platforms created by MBGE to advance their own advocacy.

It is also quite evident that the results of the JGP are perfectly aligned with readily identifiable gender needs and national priorities as articulated in key national policies and plans, in particular NPGAD, Vision 2016 and Vision 2036. They are also strongly aligned to the mandates of individual Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNOs), CSO IPs, the UNDAF and global gender norms and standards. In this regard, the programme did achieve an appreciable measure of external coherence. Weakness in external coordination did limit coherence in action. For instance, there is little evidence that the JGP was able to link-up with initiatives on gender by development partners such as the European Union and USAID.

e) Accountability

By all accounts, the JGP excelled on accountability for resources. The UN has good systems for the management of, and

accountability for, programme resources and these were strictly adhered to. However, the programme had serious challenges with regard to accountability for results. Monitoring, which is the principal method of ensuring accountability for results, was weak. Furthermore, there was no systematic approach to mutual accountability, with the result that PUNOs who failed to meet their obligations to the JGP were not held accountable. There is no evidence that the government and the UN held each other accountable for overall programme performance either. Whilst mechanisms such as the Component Coordination Group (CCG), and the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) could serve mutual accountability purposes, they focused on reports by IPs. Leadership engagement, that is the RC and the UNCT, is crucial for mutual accountability. And so is the engagement of the government. There is little evidence of such engagement by the parties to ensure that each performed its role.

f) Sustainability

There is strong evidence that the results the JGP pursued shall be sustained beyond the life of the programme. First, each of the JGP components has a narrative that suggests three elements of the thinking on sustainability at the design stage, namely, integrating gender issues into laws and policies, changing attitudes at the "grass root" level and building the capacity of duty bearers. However, more supportive to the sustainability of JGP results are context issues. These include strong commit to gender by the government, CSOs all PUNOs.

The GoB has already made firm commitments to fund programmes on gender mainstreaming and GBV beyond the life of the programme. CSOs are also positioned to continue their work on gender mainstreaming and GBV beyond the current JGP cycle. To begin with, JGP funding constituted only a small proportion of programme/project funding of most CSO stakeholders, the only exception being Gender Perspectives. Second, CSOs are mobilising resources from development agencies such as the

European Union. It helps that most donors recognise that gender is a powerful enabler of the achievement of results in other areas of development and are, as a consequence, committed to supporting work on gender.

g) Value Addition

The JGP did add value. It produced some consequential outputs, notably integrating gender into NDP 11 and Vision 2036, and raising the profile of gender, both within the UN and nationally. The programme has shown that UN agencies can work together harmoniously and achieve results on gender, engage partners as one, and speak with one amplified voice. It has built a strong, motivated and active UN Thematic Working Group on gender. The PUNOs have gained invaluable lessons, both positive and negative, on working together through a JGP. The JGP has laid the foundation for building a broad national coalition on gender. Through the JGP, CSO partners that have hitherto worked independent of each other have discovered synergies amongst themselves. Finally, beyond bringing stakeholders to work together, the JGP has helped amplify advocacy on gender.

LESSONS LEARNED

The Joint Gender Programme is the first such initiative by the UN in Botswana. In this regard, it must be seen as a pilot from which lessons on whether the UN can work better through joint programmes in general and joint gender programmes in particular, as well as what needs to change in order for the UN to work more effectively in the context of joint gender programmes should be drawn. The experience with the JGP offers a number of instructive lessons, key amongst these are:

a) Gender remains a priority development challenge for Botswana: The message from stakeholders and documentary evidence is emphatic: Notwithstanding progress to date, on policy and legislative reforms for instance, gender is still a priority development challenge for Botswana. Gender inequality is apparent in far too many dimensions, e.g., incomes, asset ownership, access to opportunity and power, and the incidence of GBV is high, with no signs that it is reducing.

b) Effective programme design has a decisive influence on programme performance: This comes out clearly from the GEJGP as well. Deficiencies in programme design have consequences for programme implementation and performance against results. In the specific case of the JGP, there are specific design issues that could have been handled better with potentially significant gains for programme performance are: They include:

❍ *Robust assessments*: A good situational analysis and a good capacity assessment are essential foundations for a high performance programme. Had robust capacity assessments been undertaken for key stakeholders, there would have been early recognition that GeAD, which is the default fulcrum of the JGP and all programmes on gender, did not have sufficient capacity to perform its implementation and coordination roles on the JGP effectively. Appropriate mitigation measures would then have been taken.

❍ *The scale of programme ambition should match the constraints imposed by human, financial and time resources*: The scale of the JGP's ambition was way out of sync with the limited resources available to the programme. This practically set the programme up for underachievement. It is critical that target outputs are achievable within the constraints imposed by available resources.

❍ *More thoughtful and purposeful selection of cooperating partners and IPs*: In the final analysis, the JGP had more PUNOs and CSO IPs than it needed. PUNOs joined the programme based purely on their desire to be part of the programme and not, as the Guidance Note on Joint Programmes suggests, because "… they are essential for the successful implementation of the project and for producing the joint results …" (p 9). The same principle applies to the selection of IPs. In the end, some PUNOs and IPs underperformed.

○ *Clear definition of results is critical for programme performance*: The JGP struggled to apply Results Based Management (RBM) principles competently to the definition of results. The operative criteria is SMART. Deviations from this criteria, and the JGP had many, may compromise the coherence of a programme and its performance. Quite a few key outputs lacked one or more of the following: specificity, achievability, measurability or time constraint.

○ *Greater clarity regarding the capacities of partners and the division of roles is critical*: For CSO partners, a significant area of disappointment within the JGP was the volume of resources it availed for implementation of activities. They expected the UN to play a donor function whilst the UN was clear that its core strengths were technical support, convening and global norms and standards. Under the National Execution (NEX) modality of programme delivery, GeAD should have ultimate responsibility for the achievement of results. The UN and other stakeholders are obliged to recognise and support this role by a government department. This is one of the core meanings and requirements of government ownership of, and commitment to, a programme.

○ *Clearer focus on key areas of programme performance is critical for programme performance*: A focus on results also requires a clear focus on key dimensions of programme performance at the design phase. Coherence, coordination, effectiveness, sustainability and mutual accountability require deliberate planning. The JGP was strongly aligned with national priorities, the UNDAF, international norms and standards on gender and the mandates of PUNOs and CSO stakeholders on gender. Still, it fell short in terms of coordination (both internal and external) to the extent the programme coordination function was under capacitated, and GeAD was not able to effectively provide external (vertical and horizontal) coordination. Nor did the design adequately address mutual accountability.

c) Clear focus on results and reporting enhances both performance and accountability: The JGP was weak on monitoring and reporting results. This hurts the programme at several levels. First, it deprives decision-makers of the feedback they need to make timely and informed decisions about the programme's performance. Second, it weakens accountability for results. Third, it reduces the efficiency of learning. Monitoring should be systematically integrated into every stage of the programme as an exercise in verification, assurance, feedback, informing decision making and learning. That requires the engagement of M&E personnel from the design phase, through implementation to evaluation.

d) Systematic approach to accountability enhances programme harmonisation and performance: As the GEJGP observes, "… accountability … should be integral to a joint gender programme …" (p 35). The evaluation found that the UN has very robust mechanisms for accounting for resources and that these were deployed on the JGP in a manner that inspired confidence in all stakeholders. It is in the areas of accountability for results and mutual accountability that the JGP was found lacking, with adverse consequences for the programme. For instance, some of the PUNOs did not honour their resource commitments to the programme or support the activities and outputs they had committed to. This detracts from the programme's performance in many ways. In the first instance it starves the programme of resources it needs and consumes valuable resources in engaging such PUNOs. Yet, there is no evidence that the UN had a system of holding these institutions to account for their commitments. The lesson to be learnt, therefore, is that robust systems for accountability for results, including mutual accountability, should be integrated into the design of joint

programmes. Amongst the measures the GEJGP suggests are[1]:

❍ *The clarification and formalisation of the role of the Resident Coordinator*: The RC is one of the most critical partners for programme harmonisation and mutual accountability. Ideally, the RC should be more visible and engaged, with a clear focus on calling PUNOs to account.

❍ *Joint monitoring and reporting, with, a central focal point collating and presenting individual results*: To a significant extent, the JGP met this imperative, with a dedicated gender specialist serving as the joint programme coordinator. Even so, this one resource was not sufficient to cover the entire breadth of the coordination demands, especially monitoring.

❍ *Feedback loops to inform programme decision making*: Part of this is monitoring. Another is reporting. The other is active engagement, lateral and vertical, by senior personnel, notably the RC and the UNCT and their counterparts in government.

❍ *Investing in building "…demand for accountability by partner governments and CSOs*: This would include strengthening programme governance and strengthening the capacities of duty bearers such as women's organisations.

❍ *Shift in reporting towards results*: For the most part, IP reporting on the JGP was relatively strong with regard to financial resources and activities. Consistent with RBM culture, accountability would be strengthened by a shift towards reporting on results – outputs and progress towards outcomes.

The GEJGP makes the important point that part of what weakens mutual accountability is "… lack of organizational incentives for coherence/harmonization, and clear disincentives". An obvious disincentive for mutual accountability is the internal organisation of the UN, with all agencies reporting directly to their headquarters. Mutual accountability thus requires the RC to rely on soft assets to secure the commitment and accountability of PUNOs.

e) Stronger RC and UNCT engagement raises programme efficiency and effectiveness: Consistent with the GEJGP, the feedback from stakeholders suggests that one of the key lessons to be learned from the JGP is that the active and visible engagement of the top leadership of the UN is critical to programme performance. A senior government officer spoke of how the UN leadership helped communicate gender issues with senior leaders in ways GeAD doubts it could have. Yet, on the UN side, operational personnel lamented opportunities missed through inadequate engagement of senior leaders in programme implementation and advocacy. There is, therefore, recognition that the offices of members of the UNCT carry a measure of legitimacy that can help communicate programme results, mobilise partnerships and resources more effectively, and enhance coordination and mutual accountability amongst agencies. Especially critical is the leadership of the RC, who must exercise authority over his/her UNCT peers not borne from position but rather soft skills and inspiration.

f) A robust and systematic approach to advocacy and communication: Stakeholders generally felt that the JGP did not use its products and tools adequately to drive advocacy. In particular, CSOs expressed concern that a lot of the work they did in the context of the JGP was not reflected in government reporting on gender work in Botswana, nor was it used to drive advocacy on gender. Similar frustration was expressed that where IPs with innovative tools and methods of producing results hoped that such tools and methods would gain exposure, weaknesses in advocacy and communication stymied it. The lesson therefore is that a programme such as the JGP requires a

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[1] In enunciating the measures, the report has extensively borrowed the text of the GEJGP

communication and advocacy strategy to communicate results, expose innovative solutions and tools to a wider audience, facilitate resource mobilisation and partnership development, and generally influence behavioural change at the community and institutional levels.

g) CSOs is a strategic delivery mechanism for services on gender: The CSOs on the JGP have proved to be both innovative and effective as delivery vehicles for gender related services. They not only reach places and constituencies the government is not always able to reach but they often bring innovative approaches and products to bear on their engagement with communities and rights holders. Even so, and relative to the magnitude of need, CSOs have a limited footprint. This presents both an opportunity and a challenge. The challenge is that CSOs have limited capacity, which is compounded by the relative lack of donor interest in Botswana on account of its Middle Income Status. The opportunity lies in the fact that CSOs provide a potentially potent mechanism through which the government and development partners can expand the reach of gender related services more cost effectively. There is need therefore, for the government and development partners, especially the UN, to reflect on where and how CSOs could be used to more effectively deliver gender related programmes and services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation of the JGP has yielded six recommendations that the evaluator believes could help improve future programming on gender in Botswana.

Recommendation 1: A successor Joint Gender Programme should be developed

The case for a successor Joint Gender Programme is self-evident. The need is apparent from the large gender disparities across a wide range of areas of development - income and

An initiative such as the JGP should have a communications and advocacy plan/strategy,

productive assets, political leadership, - and Botswana's high rates of gender based violence.

Recommendation 2: Invest in the delivery capacity of GeAD

A strong GeAD will more effectively drive the national vision on gender, coordinate and harmonise all initiatives on gender, including those supported by development partners and CSOs, raise the efficiency and effectiveness of such interventions. Capacitating GeAD should be addressed as a shared responsibility between the GoB, the UN and other development partners because of their shared interest in having a strong coordinate their work.

Recommendation 3: Invest Adequately in Programme Design

The performance of the JGP was constrained to a very significant extent by weakness in design. Future programmes should be based on (a) situational analyses and capacity assessments that more accurately determine needs; (b) viable theories of change; (c) SMART and synergised results, (d) adequate reconciliation for the scope of interventions with the delivery capacities of stakeholders and resources at their disposal, and (e) deliberate planning for coherence, mutual accountability and monitoring and evaluation.

Recommendation 4: Strengthen accountability systems

Though both components of the JGP had M&E frameworks, there was no M&E in action. The successor programme, should have a clearer, more synergised and SMART results architecture from which an adequate M&E framework is derived. It may be advisable to take those who play key roles in the design and implementation of the programme through a good short course on Results Based Management and Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.

Recommendation 5: Improve advocacy and communication

however basic, to communicate what the programme does and the results it achieves to a

wider audience and support partnership development and resource mobilisation. This requires the engagement of the UN Communications Group at all stages of programme/project implementation.

Recommendation 6: Stronger focus on resource mobilisation

Robust resource mobilisation efforts should be made to ensure that programmes and projects are adequately funded. An important part of the strategy should include the GoB delivering more of its resources through the programme. This would help the GoB to take advantage of the agility, efficiency and innovation of CSOs to deliver services more effectively. It would also and to crowd-in resources and partnerships. Resource mobilisation should also target non-traditional sources such as the private sector.

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This evaluation of the United Nations Joint Gender Programme (JGP) is summative in nature, occurring at the end of the programme's two year cycle, 2015-2016. Its primary purpose is to determine the extent to which the JGP, as it comes to a close, "… has achieved its intended results" and delineate lessons to inform future programme work on gender mainstreaming and gender based violence. In assessing progress towards intended results, the evaluation of the JGP shall, as a prescript of the TOR, focus primarily on the following evaluation dimensions:

a) Coherence & Efficiency
b) Accountability
c) Sustainability of Results & Value Addition

Notwithstanding the prescribed focus, the Reference Group has directed that the evaluation should also cover the dimension of **relevance**. With minimal adjustments to the evaluation approach, sufficient information was gathered to adequately inform a position on relevance. The evaluation design also envisaged extensive reliance on the results of the 2012 Global Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes (GEJGP) to illuminate aspects of this evaluation.

The Joint Gender Programme is in fact two programmes in one, each with its own programme document (prodoc), budget and results framework. One is the **United Nations Joint Programme of Support for Gender Mainstreaming in Botswana: 2015-2016,** henceforth the "Gender Mainstreaming component". It started with a total budget estimate of US$2,600,000, of which only US$336,200 was funded. Per its Results and Resources Framework (RRF), it was intended to contribute to nine (9) outputs to three (3) of the five (5) outcomes of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2010-2016 (See Table 1 below).

Table 1: Inventory of target outcomes and outputs of the United Nations Joint Gender Programme of Support for Gender Mainstreaming in Botswana: 2015-2016

OUTCOME	OUTPUTS
UNDAF Outcome 1: Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights	Joint gender processes and structures developed by March 2016
	Resources leveraged and Joint Gender Programme branded by March 2015
	Advocacy conducted to ensure gender is a priority on the national development agenda by Dec 2016
	National Laws made gender sensitive by December 2016
UNDAF Outcome 3: Botswana's capacity to address health and Human Deficiency Virus and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) issues is increased, and progress made towards achieving universal access to quality services	Gender responsive services incorporated into health and HIV by Dec 2016
	Access by men and boys to quality services for SRH, HIV/AIDS and TB scaled up by Dec 2016
UNDAF Outcome 5: Increased Child, Youth and Women empowerment and Participation at all levels by Dec 2016	Government policies, planning and programming are gender mainstreamed by Dec 2016
	Gender transformation strategies in tribal administrations to be adopted by Dec 2016
	Youth sensitisation on gender transformation to be conducted by Dec 2016

Source: United Nations Joint Gender Programme of Support for Gender Mainstreaming in Botswana: 2015-2016

The second component is the **United Nations Joint Programme of Support to End Gender Based Violence in Botswana: 2015-2016**, henceforth the "Gender Based Violence component". Its estimate budget for the two years was US$1,035,000 but only US$505,000 was ultimately available for the implementation of activities. It also had a large number of outputs, twelve (12), across the same UNDAF outcomes the Gender Mainstreaming programme supports. Its target outcomes and outputs are reproduced verbatim in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Inventory of Outcomes and Outputs of the Joint Gender Programme of Support to End Gender Based Violence in Botswana: 2015-2016

OUTCOME	OUTPUTS
Component: Joint Programme of Support to End Gender Based Violence in Botswana in Botswana: 2015-2016	
UNDAF Outcome 1: Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights	Gender Surveillance System for monitoring service provider preparedness established
	Monitoring and evaluation framework designed and implemented
	Enhanced participation in advocacy efforts to achieve the National Action Plan to end GBV's four goals
	Capacity on protocol and service standards for supporting survivors of GBV (inclusive of special provisions for children) built
	National interest in GBV research established
UNDAF Outcome 3: Botswana's capacity to address health and Human Deficiency Virus and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) issues is increased, and progress made towards achieving universal access to quality services	GBV indicators integrated into existing HIV structures
	GBV community referral structures and systems established
	Counselling packages for perpetrators of GBV developed and implemented
UNDAF Outcome 5: Increased Child, Youth and Women empowerment and Participation at all levels by Dec 2016	Community based initiatives implemented for GBV prevention
	Access to safe spaces for survivors of GBV expanded
	Programme for parenting skills introduced and implemented in Botswana
	Community based male involvement programmes scaled up

Source: United Nations Joint Gender Programme of Support to end Gender Based Violence in Botswana: 2015-2016

Each of the two components of the JGP has its own programme document. However, amongst stakeholders, the JGP is understood as one programme and is managed as such. One reason proffered for splitting the components is the magnitude of each of the challenges of **Gender Mainstreaming (GM)** - which is about integrating all gender related issues (equality, the empowerment of women and girls, gender based discrimination, human rights, etc.) into development processes, and **Gender Based Violence (GBV)**, which has a specific focus on ending the gender based physical, psychological, financial and sexual abuse of women, men, boys and girls.

1.2 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Joint Gender Programme was implemented in a context with several standout attributes, four specific to Botswana and two global. The Botswana aspects of the context are: (a) Botswana's position as an Upper Middle Income Country (MIC); (b) rising human development challenges; (c) the nature and extent of gender

related problems in Botswana, more specifically gender disparities and GBV; and (d) an evolving national response to gender inequality and GBV. The global aspects of the context are the UN Reforms in general and determined global action to achieve gender equality and end all forms discrimination against women as desirable ends in their own right and as means to achieving other important development goals.

a) *Middle Income Country[2] (MIC) context:* Botswana, a low income and least developed country at independence in 1966, is now an upper middle income country. In 2015, Botswana had a Per Capita Gross National Income (GNI) of US$6, 510, well above the lower upper MIC threshold of US$4,036 but some US$5, 965 short of the high income threshold of US$12, 475 (World Bank Database).

The benefits of the transition from low income to upper middle income include a sharp reduction in income poverty, near universal access to basic education and health services, rapid expansion of access to essential services (e.g., sanitation and water) in general, fairly well developed physical infrastructure and human capital, and achievement of medium human development on the Human Development Index (HDI) scale. This progress also means, however, that in relative terms, Botswana is no longer seen as a country with a high need for development assistance. Consequently, the presence of the development community in Botswana, including UN agencies, is thin, and it is relatively difficult to mobilise development resources for Botswana. So, for the UN agencies in Botswana, resource mobilisation is relatively challenging compared to the experience of their counterparts working in poorer countries.

b) *Human development challenges:* Though a medium human development country, Botswana still has some serious human development challenges to contend with. Over the NDP 10 period (2010-2016), real GDP growth averaged 3.9%, well below the Vision 2016 target of eight (8) percent per annum. During the same period, Botswana's fiscal and debt positions weakened, with budgets deficit becoming more frequent and public debt increasing both in absolute terms and as a share of national income. At the last count (2010), 19.3% of the population subsisted below the poverty line (Statistics Botswana). This is atypical of upper middle income countries. It reflects the relative concentration of benefits and exclusion that is typical of mining[3] led economies. The rate of unemployment hovered around 17.8% for most of the NDP 10 period, rising to 20% in 2015 (Statistics Botswana).

An especially worrisome dimension of Botswana's unemployment problem is its changing profile, in particular, the rising share of youths with college diplomas and degrees within the population of the unemployed. The employment situation deteriorated further in 2015 and 2016 on account of anaemic job creation, frequent retrenchments and recurring business closures. Mining[4] is the hardest hit sector, due in large measure to unfavourable global commodity markets. Botswana's high rates of poverty and unemployment coexist with some of the highest levels of income and asset inequalities in the world. Botswana being patriarchal, inequality has a strong gender dimension. Other key human development

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[2] Low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita below $1,025 or less in 2015; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $1,026 and $4,035; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $4,036 and $12,475; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,476 or more.

[3] Mining has been the mainstay of the Botswana economy for over four decades, contributing about a third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), half of the government budget and more than three quarters of export revenue.

[4] Two major mines, Tati Nickel and BCL, have been closed, the latter occasioning a loss of about 6,000 jobs, and an economic meltdown in the copper mining town of Selibe-Phikwe and the region that hosts it.

challenges include high rates of HIV prevalence, recurring droughts, vulnerability to climate change, and a generally fragile environment.

c) *The nature and extent of the gender problem in Botswana*: Botswana has made significant progress towards gender equality and the elimination of discrimination against women. Even so, it still has significant gender problems. Due in part to a legacy of patriarchy, Botswana's gender disparities are rooted in legislation[5] and culture. According to the 2015 Botswana MDG report, access to assets and formal employment is heavily skewed in favour of males. The report attributes these disparities to inequities in inheritance and succession practices. According to the report, there are 64 women who own farmland for every 100 men who do so and 39 women who own cattle for every 100 men. Women were also found to be concentrated in low paying jobs. Furthermore, for every 100 unemployed men with no training, there were 150 unemployed women of the same category. The disparities are also apparent at the level of decision making. For instance, the report indicates that women accounted for only 7.9% of the legislative seats in 2015.

Another serious challenge in Botswana is Gender Based Violence (GBV). A 2012 GBV Indicator study made the following sobering conclusions: (i) Of those interviewed 67% of the women had experienced some form of GBV in their lifetime, while 44% of the men admitted perpetrating some form of violence; (ii) The most common form of GBV experienced by women is Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), with 62% of women reporting lifetime experience of GBV and 47% of men admitting being perpetrators; (iii) The most common forms of IPV are emotional, physical, economic and sexual abuse; (iv) An estimated 58% of the victims of rape were between 16 to 35 years of age, whilst 27% were aged below sixteen.

d) *An evolving national response on gender*: Botswana recognises that gender equality is a human development accelerator, and further that it is fundamentally about fulfilling the rights of women and girls to fair and equal treatment vis-à-vis men and boys. For more than two decades, Botswana has stayed on the path of legislative, policy and programme reforms to promote gender equality, empower women and eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, guided by global consensus on norms and standards. In 1995, the Government of Botswana (GoB) adopted the Beijing Platform for Action. It acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1996 and to the CEDAW Optional Protocol[6] in 2007.

Botswana is also a signatory to the 1997 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Declaration on Gender and Development and its "Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women & Children but is yet to sign the SADC Gender Protocol. Following accession to CEDAW, the GoB began a process of reviewing and amending its laws and policies to rid them of gender based discrimination. It published its first major policy on gender equality, the Women in Development Policy (WID), in 1996 and reviewed it in 2015 to produce the National Policy on Gender and Development (NPGAD). Through the NPGAD, the GoB aims to meet global norms and standards on gender and development as enunciated in international and regional protocols.

e) *UN Reform and determined global action on gender and development*: The JGP was developed at a time of ongoing reform within the UN in response to change and new demands. Key elements of these reforms are delivering results

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[5] Botswana has reviewed and/or enacted several laws to address gender iniquities. The Abolition of Marital Power Act of 2004 and the Domestic Violence Act of 2008 are new laws with a clear focus on gender equality and GBV.

[6] The Optional Protocol is a monitoring and evaluation instrument for CEDAW

to those most in need, doing so effectively and efficiently, and strengthening accountability. Joint programming and the Joint Gender Programme approach are products of these reforms. As the Global Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes (GEJGP) observes, "Joint United Nations gender programmes emerged from the convergence of multiple flows: the trajectory of United Nations system-wide reform…; 2005 aid and development effectiveness reforms; and the drive towards greater effort and emphasis on gender equality and women's empowerment" (p.13). The JGP further delineates two ways in which these reforms grew in "… scale and volume" on gender, especially since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness:

○ The establishment of the MDG-F in 2007 with a contribution from the Government of Spain. One of the MDG-F thematic windows was on gender.

○ The establishment of UN Women in 2010. Formed through merging four entities, UN Women leads the global effort to accelerate progress towards gender equality, expand opportunity, and address discrimination based on gender.

It helps to let the GEJGP speak on the utility of joint gender programmes in particular and joint programmes in general, and the concept of a joint gender programme.

As part of the wider body of joint programmes …, joint United Nations gender programmes serve a dual purpose. Firstly, at operational level, they constitute a development cooperation instrument for organizing, resourcing and delivering gender equality work at country or regional level. Secondly, and more upstream, they serve as country or regional-level mechanisms for implementing the United Nations' wider political trajectory towards coherence, within the field of gender equality. Simply put, the theory – and hope – is that *changed development cooperation practices will lead to changes in lives.* No external definition for a joint gender programme exists. That applied for this evaluation is: *'A Joint Programme with an explicit objective of empowering women and/or promoting gender equality'* (p. 13-14)

2. THEORY OF CHANGE AND PROGRAMME DESIGN

2.1 THEORY OF CHANGE

Every programme is based on some idea of how and why the desired change will happen, no matter how rudimentary the programme design. Ideally, the idea of how the desired change happens, which we call the **Theory of Change**, should be premised on a solid conceptual/theoretical and empirical understanding of causality within the programme and the environment it is simultaneously influenced by and seeks to influence. This should be the grid around which the programme is constructed. It describes the "chain of reactions" through which programme inputs - money, human capital, raw materials, etc. - are transformed into the desired end results (impacts). Thus, in this instance, the theory of change is a mapping of how programme inputs are transformed, through activities, into gender equality, women's empowerment and the eradication of gender based violence. The theory of change deduced from a review of the results architectures of the two components of the JGP is summarised graphically in Figure 1 below

Figure 1: The Joint Gender Programme Theory of Change

Source: Derived from the Joint Gender Programme Results and Resources Framework

The programme envisages change happening as follows: The cooperating UN agencies, the GoB and CSO implementing partners implement activities in five mutually supporting strategic areas - the review of policies and laws, mainstreaming gender into development processes, strengthening the capacity of institutions and service providers, strengthening monitoring and evaluation systems and advocacy and research. Each of these activities will contribute to outputs in three categories as follows:

a) *A conducive regulatory environment*: A significant amount of the push towards gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls, and ending GBV will have to come through regulatory reforms. This means reviewing policies and laws to make sure they support

gender related end goals; reviewing and capacitating the requisite institutions to competently pursue and/or support the gender related goals and objectives set out in the country's laws, policies and programmes and to provide equitable services to men, boys, women and girls; integrating gender into development processes in pursuit of equitable development outcomes for men, women, boys and girls; generating the knowledge and evidential basis for progressive gender-related reforms through research and programme work; and undertaking informed advocacy at the community and leadership levels to transform attitudes on gender. Assuming informed and strategic choices, each category of activities could contribute meaningfully to the creation of a conducive environment for the achievement of gender equality, women's empowerment, ending gender based violence and access to quality services on health and HIV/AIDS.

b) *Institutional capacity*: Under what the prodocs call "partnerships", the JGP focusses on "…capacity building across a wide range of stakeholders …" Activities that support outputs under this category should not only target the agency of individual organisations but should also seek to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination in order to build synergies and amplify the collective impact of stakeholders doing gender related work. Capacity building will benefit from all five categories of activities.

Policy and legislative reforms give institutions' mandates the force of a policy or a law, which they can deploy to secure benefits for rights-holders. Mainstreaming gender into development processes makes it easier for institutions working on gender to access and/or avail resources for gender as well as to access those in need of their services. Activities that produce knowledge and evidence, those that support advocacy and those that strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems put at the disposal of stakeholder institutions, tools that enhance their capacity to deliver on their priority end results and make the environment more favourable for transformational gender related work. Effective

coordination within the programme raises efficiency by building synergies, reducing transaction costs and magnifying impact. Effective vertical and horizontal coordination beyond the programme achieves the same effects on a national scale.

c) *Knowledge and evidence*: This is a critical output for driving transformational change on gender, whether legislative, institutional, or behavioural. As Figure 1 shows, this output benefits primarily from activities under the broad categories of monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, research and advocacy. Knowledge and evidence are powerful drivers of transformation because they help bring down some of the most potent structural constraints on transformation for gender equality and the elimination of gender based violence, e.g., ignorance, culture and tradition. Most important, such products guide stakeholders on what works and what does not.

The achievement of the above outputs will contribute to three outcomes that are essential for progressive gender related transformation. One is UNDAF Outcome 1: "Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights". The achievement of this outcome will mean that duty bearers, i.e., institutions of service delivery and leaders, are competent to provide services that transform development outcomes and societal attitudes on gender.

The second outcome is UNDAF outcome 5: "Increased Child, Youth and Women empowerment and Participation at all levels by 2016". The third is UNDAF Outcome 3: "Botswana's capacity to address health and Human Deficiency Virus and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) issues is increased, and progress made towards achieving universal access to quality services"

If service provision on gender is effective and efficient, rights holders (women, men, youth and children) are adequately empowered to claim their rights, and communities are imbued with the right traits on gender, the desired goals/impacts of gender equality and an end to gender based violence will be achieved.

2.2 PROGRAMME DESIGN

The Joint Gender Programme was designed through a participatory process. All interviewed stakeholders confirmed participating in the initial consultations through which the key gender issues for which UN support could make a difference were identified, priorities established, and the strategic results the joint gender programme should focus on defined. All stakeholders, and most significant the Government of Botswana, are sufficiently happy with the consultation process for ownership to be adjudged very strong. However, no capacity assessment was undertaken to ascertain the readiness of key role players to perform their roles to expectation. In the case of GeAD, whose position as the government's lead department on gender makes it a natural anchor for the programme, the lack of a capacity analysis proved costly for the JGP, with GeAD unable to implement planned activities and provide external coordination.

The consultations did identify priorities, broadly defined as gender mainstreaming and ending gender based violence. Within these priorities, there are several stand out themes. These are:

a) A gender-focused review of policies and laws to create an enabling regulatory environment for the pursuit of priority results on gender;

b) Generating knowledge and evidence to support advocacy for progressive gender focused reforms and the achievement of policy goals;

c) Mobilising partnerships/coalitions for action on gender, strengthening the capacity of a range of stakeholders and strengthening coordination.

d) Undertaking advocacy to raise awareness amongst stakeholders, help mobilise resources and increase support for evidence-based action on gender.

e) Action or execution of gender equality and gender based violence programmes and strategies.

2.2.1 Key Features of Programme Design

a) *Participating UN Agencies*

Table 3: UN Agencies Participating in the Joint Gender Programme and financial commitments for 2015

AGENCY	GM 2015	GM 2016	GBV 2015	GBV 2016	TOTAL	IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION
UNAIDS	-	-	-	2,000	2000	Technical Expertise
UNDP	127,000	80,000	172,000	100,000	479000	Administrative Agent Technical Expertise
UNFPA	75,000	24,200	136,000	25,000	260,200	Managing Agent Technical Expertise Coordination Management
UNICEF	20,000	10,000	45,000	20,000	95,000	Technical Expertise
UNWOMEN	-		5,000	-	5,000	Technical Expertise
TOTAL	222,000	114,200	358,000	147,000	841,200	

Source: Joint Gender Programme

A total of nine (9) UN agencies committed themselves to the programme at its inception. In the final analysis, only five agencies – UNAIDS, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, and UN Women – provided technical and/or financial resources to the programme.

There was no purposeful criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of agencies. In fact, the prevailing attitude was "the more the merrier", which meant that agencies could make commitments to be part of the programme without having adequately thought through what their role would be. That said, the JGP had a strong Technical Working Group that must rank as one of the JGP's significant successes. Table 4 above provides the list of UN agencies that were active on the JGP and their financial contributions for 2015 and 2016.

b) Budget

For the two years of its programme cycle, the JGP had a planned estimate budget of US$3.635 Million, comprising US$2.6 Million for the gender mainstreaming component and US$1.035 Million for the gender based violence component. As shown in Figure 2, in the final analysis, each component of the programme mobilized only a fraction of its planned budget. The cooperating agencies were unable to raise additional resources for the JGP. However, resource mobilization actions were conducted at the start of the JGP by the UNCT; meetings were held with different regional development partners in South Africa where most of these partners are based.

Figure 2: Total Funding for the JGP by component, year and source of funding

Source: Joint Gender Programme

Over the two years of programme implementation, the gender mainstreaming component was funded to the tune of US$336,200, resulting in a funding shortfall of 87.1% in relation to the planned budget of

US$2.6 Million. The GBV component fared much better with total actual funding of US$505,000 and a funding shortfall of 51.2% given a planned budget of US$1,035,000.

c) Priority Results

The JGP's priority results are summarised in Box 1 below. As Box one shows, each of the JGP components was designed to contribute to three outcomes. The outcomes are derived verbatim from the UNDAF. Whilst this makes for perfect alignment between the JGP and the UNDAF, it has the disadvantage of making the outcome rather remote from the JGP itself.

Box 1: Priority JGP Outcomes and Outputs by Component

Outcome 1: Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights

Outputs: Gender Mainstreaming

1. Joint gender processes and structures development by March 2016
2. Resources leveraged and Joint Gender Programme branded by March 2015
3. Advocacy conducted to ensure gender is a priority on the national development agenda by Dec 2016
4. National Laws made gender sensitive by December 2016

Outputs: Ending Gender Based Violence

1. Gender Surveillance System for monitoring service provider preparedness established Resources leveraged and Joint Gender Programme branded by March 2015
2. Monitoring and evaluation framework designed and implemented
3. Enhanced participation in advocacy efforts to achieve the National Action Plan to end GBV's four goals
4. Capacity on protocol and service standards for supporting survivors of GBV (inclusive of special provisions for children) built
5. National interest in GBV research established

Outcome 2: Botswana's capacity to address health and Human Deficiency Virus and Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) issues is increased, and progress made towards achieving universal access to quality services

Outputs: Gender Mainstreaming

1. Gender responsive services incorporated into health and HIV by Dec 2016
2. Access by men and boys to quality services for SRH, HIV/AIDS and TB scaled up by Dec 2016

Outputs: Ending Gender Based Violence

1. GBV indicators integrated into existing HIV structures
2. GBV community referral structures and systems established
3. Counselling packages for perpetrators of GBV developed and implemented

Outcome 3: Increased Child, Youth and Women empowerment and Participation at all levels by Dec 2016

Outputs: Gender Mainstreaming

1. Government policies, planning and programming are gender mainstreamed by Dec 2016
2. Gender transformation strategies in tribal administrations to be adopted by Dec 2016
3. Youth sensitisation on gender transformation to be conducted by Dec 2016

Outputs: Ending Gender Based Violence

1. Community based initiatives implemented for GBV prevention
2. Access to safe spaces for survivors of GBV expanded
3. Programme for parenting skills introduced and implemented in Botswana
4. Community based male involvement programmes scaled up

Source: Joint Gender Programme

2.2.2. Note on Programme Design

The programme design had some obvious strengths and weaknesses. Synopses of these are provided hereunder.

a) Design Strengths

(i) The participatory and consultative approach to programme development: The strong participation of key stakeholders in the

development of the JGP is a key strength of the programme. It availed the collective knowledge and experience of key stakeholders to inform both the problem diagnosis and the identification of solutions, created opportunity for stronger cross-stakeholder coordination and the harmonisation of the programme with initiatives by other stakeholders, including the government, CSOs and other development partners.

(ii) Coherence and Alignment: The extensive consultation and participation by stakeholders created opportunity for the maximisation of programme coherence and alignment with strategic instruments and partners. As observed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, the JGP is strongly aligned with national, priorities, the UNDAF and global norms and standards, in particular, The Beijing Platform for Action, CEDAW, MDGS, and the SDGs).

(iii) Partnership and resource mobilisation: The JGP was built with a focus on partnership building and resource mobilisation. Based on the experience of the programme, it can reasonably be concluded that the JGP achieved a measure of success with regard to bringing UN agencies to work more closely together on gender and facilitating cooperation amongst CSOs active on gender. This is acknowledged by all stakeholders - the government, CSOs and the UN.

These strengths represent potential that could have been exploited to make the programme more effective and efficient in pursuing its goals. The experience of the programme shows that these strengths were not adequately exploited. In particular, the programme did not achieve the desired levels of vertical and horizontal coordination, nor did it achieve the anticipated levels of synergy and efficiency. That is in part because these strengths co-existed with significant weaknesses as discussed below.

b) Design Weaknesses

The quality of a programme's design has a decisive influence on its performance, both in terms of delivery against target end results and scores against key evaluation criteria. Relevance, coherence, accountability, sustainability and

value addition do not just happen. They all require conscious effort at the planning/design phase of the programme. The evaluation points to the following as the design flaws of the JGP:

(i) Inadequacies in assessment: Two types of assessment are critical to successful programme design. One is a quality situational analysis, providing as accurate a picture of the state of play as possible, including the nature, extent and dynamics of the problem; the institutional context; extant policy, strategy and programme/project responses; constraints and challenges; and an informed prioritisation of issues. The second, as the global evaluation of joint gender programmes suggests, is a robust "… capacity analysis of the policy/institutional environment for joint gender programmes, including United Nations and national partners' capacity development needs and ability to work within a joint modality on gender" (p 22). Whilst extensive consultations and literature review were undertaken at the preparatory phase of the programme as part of a situational analysis, there is no evidence of capacity analysis.

The programme betrays an original lack of appreciation of: (a) the impact a well capacitated Gender Affairs Department (GeAD) could have had on programme performance and (b) the preparedness of the UN to handle the practical challenges of working together within a joint programme. In the end, GeAD exhibited serious capacity constraints that had adverse consequences for the horizontal and vertical coordination, reporting and advocacy necessary for the programme's success and that of the national gender programme as a whole. UN agencies did not quite work as smoothly either. Before UN Women opened office in Botswana, only one agency, UNFPA, had gender expertise, which was hardly sufficient to support the entire programme. Programme coordination was inadequately staffed, with the lone gender expert in the Managing Agent serving as programme coordinator.

(ii) Programme ambition was too high: All stakeholders agree that relative to the human

resource capacity, financial, and time constraints it faced, the JGP was too ambitious in scope. The nature and volume of the outputs the programme pursued - 21 in total, with some approximating outcomes - required far more time and resources (human and financial) than were available to the programme. For instance, reviewing policies and laws to rid them of gender based discrimination, building institutional capacity, and changing patriarchal attitudes towards GBV are longer term changes. In fact, it could be argued that several of the outputs were outcome level results, for instance, change in attitudes and the integration of gender into development processes. In the end, even though the JGP did achieve some consequential results, it fell well short of the level of ambition its RRF represents. The programme had simply not managed to reconcile the scale of its ambition with its personnel, skills, financial and time constraints. It was too underfunded and its duration was too short for the planned results to be achieved.

(iii) Lack of focus: The JGP sought to do too many things within a space of two years and with a planned budget of only US$3,635 million. The programme pursues results in two broad areas, gender mainstreaming and gender based violence and has dispersed its resources over 21 outputs in three outcomes in these two areas. What this did was limit the programme's capacity to make meaningful change in many areas. Community mobilisation, for instance, is a resource intensive activity that could easily have consumed the entire programme budget on its own, so are gender focused regulatory reforms, the development of effective gender surveillance and monitoring and evaluation systems, and capacity building. To be certain, all the JGP's outputs are relevant but for the programme to have durable results, it should have focussed on a manageable set of outputs that it could support to a level necessary to produce meaningful and lasting change. The extent of the cost of the lack of focus becomes apparent when consideration is given to the funding received by some of the IPs. Several

of them got no more than US5, 000 in 2016. In the event, all some could do was host an event. Substantive and durable results require effort over a period of time.

(iv) Weak definition of results: Properly defining results and building a viable results architecture is critical for programme success. Inadequate results definition is tantamount to inadequate planning, a consequence of which is poor implementation, inefficient translation of effort into results, and verification challenges. The evaluation identified three types of problems with the definition of results within the JGP.

First, the results do not consistently follow the SMART criteria, the common deficiencies being lack of specificity, measurability and achievability. For instance, the programme output "*National Laws made gender sensitive*" does not specify which of the country's many laws will be reviewed, suggesting the improbable/unachievable target of reviewing all laws by 2016. This is also true for the gender mainstreaming output "*Government policies, planning and programming are gender mainstreamed*".

Second, some of the "outputs" were not crafted as outputs. For instance, "*Youth sensitisation on gender transformation to be conducted*" has the character of an event rather than an output. "*Advocacy conducted to ensure gender is a priority on the national development agenda*" puts emphasis on the activity/process rather than the end result. Furthermore, many of the consequential "outputs" do look like outcomes. By definition, an output is a result whose achievement the programme has control over. This is not the case for some of the JGP outputs. They mostly require the input of stakeholders not involved in the programme. That makes them outcomes. Examples include proposed gender focused legislative, policy, planning and institutional/structural reforms.

Finally, a majority of the outputs were not time bound.

3. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation design mandated a mixed methods approach. Mixed method designs employ at least one quantitative method and one qualitative method. They offer several advantages, notably "… (a) triangulation, which seeks convergence of findings; (b) bracketing, which seeks a range of estimates on the correct answer; and (c) complementarity, in which different methods are used to assess different study components or phenomena to assess the plausibility of identified threats to validity, or to enhance the interpretability of assessments of a single phenomenon …" Greene *et al*, 1989). Triangulation and complementarity are the key considerations in our choice of a mixed methods design.

3.1 Qualitative Approach

Due largely to the nature of information requirements, the methodological approach rested to a very large extent on qualitative methods. The primary focus was on (i) the impressions of key people - decision makers such as agency heads and their counterparts[7] in government and CSOs, and programme management and monitoring and evaluation personnel across stakeholder institutions – regarding the performance of the programme and (ii) insights to be gleaned from documentary evidence, including programme/project documents, progress reports, annual reports, monitoring and evaluation reports and audit reports. The approach consisted of:

(i) *Desk Research (Review of documents)*: A number of documents containing conceptual, qualitative and quantitative information were reviewed. The first category of documents reviewed were programme documents for both the Gender Mainstreaming and GBV components of the programme, overall UN Botswana programming documents, i.e., the extant UNDAF and Government of Botswana and United Nations Programme Operational Plan

(UNPOP). This was a necessary step towards appreciating the JGP's design and theory of change, i.e., the assumed causal relationships within the programme, and establishing the degree of coherence and alignment between the JGP and the overall UN programme in Botswana. The second category of reviewed documents were those that define the national context in which the programme was developed and national priorities on gender. Key amongst these were gender related policies such as the Women in Development Policy (WID) of 1996, the NPGAD of 2015, Vision 2016, the Vision 2036 Framework and National Development Plans 10 and 11. The purpose of reviewing these documents was to establish the extent of coherence between the JGP and national priorities.

The third category of documents reviewed consists of international norms and standards on gender equality, women's empowerment and discrimination against women. They include CEDAW, MDGs, SDGs, ECOSOC and General Assembly Resolutions and the SADC Gender Protocol. They were reviewed to ascertain the extent of the JGP's alignment with global norms and standards on gender equality. The fourth and final set of documents are those associated with the 2012 evaluation of the Global Joint Gender Programme (GJGP). They comprise the synthesis report on the evaluation of the GJGP and four associated case studies, viz., Albania, Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda. The review of these documents provided invaluable guidance to the design of the evaluation as well as lessons from international experience.

(ii) *Key informant interviews:* This aspect of the methodology rested on structured and unstructured questionnaires designed to secure information from key players in the design and implementation of the JGP. Given the number of IPs (7) and UN agencies (7) involved, all participating UN agencies, government

departments, and CSOs were targeted for interview with a probability of 1. The universe of interviewees comprised heads of resident UN agencies and programmes and their implementing partner (government and CSOs) counterparts, JGP programme focal points across resident agencies, programme focal points and monitoring and evaluation personnel. Separate questionnaire instruments, attached as annexes, were used to guide discussions with UN JGP focal points, IP focal points, and decision makers (Heads of Agencies and their counterparts). Since the programme ran for only two years, a decision was taken not to engage final beneficiaries because it was too early to assess impact. In lieu thereof, IPs were asked to profile successes stories in their parts of the programme. Four of these were submitted and are summarised in Chapter 6 of this report.

(iii) *Focus Group Discussions (FGD)*: Groups of peers (UN JGP focal points) and IP JGP focal points were interviewed to get insights into key dimensions of the programme, including design, implementation, performance and partnerships. Only two FGDs were constituted and interviewed.

(iv) *Case studies*: Case studies were sought to help provide detailed insights into "success stories). The main objective was to understand how and why particular interventions performed better than others. Three success stories are reviewed in this report.

3.2 Quantitative approach

The quantitative aspect of the methodology pursued quantitative data, on the basis of which basis quantitative techniques were applied. The sources of quantitative data were limited to budgets and financial reports, from which the stocks and flows of revenue and expenditure could be identified. Additional quantitative data included mundane considerations such as sources of funding, implementing partners, fund management models and programme type.

3.3 Data Analysis

Drawing on information gathered through interviews, and the review of documents, the evaluation adopted two approaches to data analysis, Framework Analysis and Thematic Network Analysis. For purposes of this evaluation, the framework of analysis is defined by the original core scope elements and specific objectives of the JGP evaluation, namely Coherence, Efficiency, Accountability, Sustainability and Value Addition as well as the non-core but essential elements of relevance, effectiveness and ownership The framework matrix facilitates the tabulation of information from both interviews and desk research, in summary form, by evaluation dimensions and themes. It proved to be a robust way of summarising (reducing the volume of information), analysing, interpreting and presenting qualitative information.

The evaluation also sought to identify pervasive themes or patterns. These themes gave the evaluation a measure of focus in the identification of key lessons to be learned from the implementation of the JGP. The lessons are summarised in Section 5 of the report. Thematic analysis has one important advantage over framework analysis. It allows the data to speak and lead to the themes that should be followed rather than impose them upfront. It is in this regard complementary to framework analysis.

Quantitative analysis was limited to frequency tables and charts in instances where numeric data was available, and averages, ratios and percentages in the case of financial data. Financial data - budgets, delivery/expenditure, and resource mobilisation – provide insights on a number of key areas of programme performance, including ownership, programme ambition, priorities and implementation capacity. The data series covers only two years, 2015 and 2016.

4. EVALUATION FINDINGS

4.1 RELEVANCE

Stakeholders are unanimous that the JGP is very relevant. The relevance of the programme is identifiable at several levels, namely:

❍ **Need** - It addresses readily identifiable and strong enough needs in Botswana, e.g. high levels of GBV and gender disparities and their effects on human development outcomes;

❍ **National priorities** – Gender equality, women's empowerment and ending discrimination against women are development priorities for Botswana, reflected in key government policies and strategies such as Vision 2016 and its successor, Vision 2036, NDP 10 and NDP 11, and the National Policy on Gender and Development (NPGAD) of 2015;

❍ **Agency mandates -** All the cooperating UN agencies see gender equality as an inalienable, integral and indivisible human right, a priority development goal in its own right, and a powerful bridge to the sustainable human development impacts they (the agencies) seek, and are required to integrate gender into their work;

❍ **IP mandates** – Gender is a core mandate for virtually all the CSOs implementing partners on the programme and;

❍ **International Norms and Standards** – The JGP pursues global and regional goals, norms and standards on gender and development as enunciated in key international development frameworks, agendas and protocols, including the MDGs, the SDGs, CEDAW, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development.

(a) National need

As the report observes in Section 1.2 (c), Botswana's gender related challenges are significant and have deep links to a pervasive culture of patriarchy and legislation that is not gender neutral. They are manifest in unequal access to, and control over, productive assets, for instance land and cattle. According to the 2015

Botswana MDG Report, for every 100 women who owned farmland, there were only 64 women and for every 100 women who owned cattle, there were only 39 women. These disparities have their origins in inheritance, succession practices and laws that historically favour men.

Gender inequality is also apparent in employment and income patterns. Women generally are concentrated in relatively low paying jobs such as primary school teaching and nursing and are more likely to be unemployed or employed in the informal sector than men. According to the Botswana MDG Report 2015, for every 100 unemployed men with no training, there were 150 unemployed women. The disparities are also apparent at the level of access to power. Nowhere is this more acute than in high level political representation. In 2015, women accounted for only 7.9% of the legislative seats (BMDGR, 2015). A significant gender gap also exists with regards to executive leadership but is narrowing, especially in the public sector.

Statistics on gender based violence suggest it is an acute problem. Generalisations based on the 2012 GBV Indicator study suggest that: (a) 67% of Botswana women experience some form of GBV in their lifetime, (b) 44% of the men perpetrate one form of violence or another, and (c) the most common form of GBV experienced by women is Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) with 62% of women being victims and 47% of men being perpetrators. The most common forms of IPV are emotional, physical, economic and sexual abuse. An estimated 58% of the victims of rape are aged 16 to 35 years and a staggering 27% are aged below sixteen. These statistics suggest acute levels of violations of the rights of women and girls, with potentially significant adverse consequences for their development and their contribution to the development of the country.

The JGP derives its relevance from the magnitude of need suggested by the foregoing. Achieving parity between men and women and the eradication of gender based violence is both a human rights imperative and a human

development imperative. It will delivers fairness and justice for women and gives impetus to Botswana's charge towards its priority human development goals.

(b) National Priorities

Gender equality, women's empowerment and the eradication of gender based violence are national priorities. Since the adoption of the Women in Development policy in 1996 and strong advocacy for gender equality and women's rights in the 1980s and 1990s by groups such as Emang Basadi, Botswana has prioritised gender equality, the empowerment of women and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women in legislative, policy and programme reforms and initiatives. Global norms and standards such as the Beijing Platform for Action, which Botswana adopted in 1995, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol, to which it acceded in 1996 and in 2007 respectively, and the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development and its "Addendum on Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women & Children" have, to a very significant extent, guided Botswana's work on gender and development. Botswana is also a signatory to the MDGs and the SDGs.

With support from CSOs and UN agencies, Botswana has reformed its laws and policies to rid them of gender based discrimination. It published its first major policy on gender equality, the Women in Development Policy (WID), in 1996 and reviewed it in 2015 to produce the National Policy on Gender and Development (NPGAD). The Domestic Violence Act (2008) and the Abolition of Marital Power Act (2004) were introduced to respectively help arrest the twin evils of domestic violence and discrimination against women. Until the introduction of the latter act, a married woman was effectively a minor in relation to her husband, requiring his consent in order to open a bank account, access land or start a business, whilst he did not need hers to do the same. Through the NPGAD, the GoB aims to meet

global norms and standards on gender and development as enunciated in international and regional protocols and is making progress.

According to an unpublished report by GeAD, as at December 2016, a total of eight (8) Ministries, including MFED had been capacitated to mainstream gender into their work. With support from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the GoB, helped MFED and six (6) other ministries, develop capacity to integrate gender into public finance. In 2012, the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs (MNIGA), formerly the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs, in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), took the important step of hosting a Bogosi Gender Pitso (Gender Conference for Traditional Leaders) to facilitate the mainstreaming of gender into the customary court system. The Department of Tribal Administration subsequently developed a National Action Plan for implementation of the resolutions and recommendations of the Pitso in December 2015.

With support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), GeAD developed a Gender Mainstreaming Curriculum, the purpose of which is to improve and standardise the training of development practitioners on gender and development. In 2013, the GoB began the process of domesticating CEDAW, a process for which UNDP support has been secured to engage a consultant to facilitate. Through GeAD, the GoB has also committed a significant amount of government grant resources to women's economic empowerment.

It is clearly evident that the GoB is committed to gender equality, women's empowerment and the elimination of discrimination against women. It is noted, however, that despite this commitment, measured in terms of policy reforms, the commitment of resources and statements by the government, progress has been slow and uneven. It has taken Botswana more than 20 years to domesticate CEDAW and Botswana is yet to

ratify the SADC Gender and Development Protocol on Women and Development. Whereas, significant government resources have flowed into gender, the government has not yet built a robust institutional machinery to lead and drive gender and development work. The feedback from stakeholders is that GeAD has limited capability (technical capacity and processes) to provide effective leadership and coordination of efforts towards the achievement of the country's vision of gender parity. Monitoring and evaluation systems for gender and development are also weak.

(c) UN agency mandates

The Integration of gender into the work of all UN agencies and Programmes is UN Policy. Every UN agency has a gender mandate derived from its own policies, international agreements such as the UN Charter and CEDAW, which assert equality between the rights of men and women, UN resolutions (ECOSOC resolution 2001/41) on gender mainstreaming (July 2001) and General Assembly resolution of (A/Res/52/100 of December 1997), and the Secretary General's Directive of 13th October 1997, which affirmed gender mainstreaming as an intrinsic part of the work of all UN agencies and programmes. Further to these, the MDGs and the SDGs have set clear goals and targets on gender and development that UN agencies and programmes are required to help their host countries achieve through their programme work and advocacy. Thus, all the cooperating agencies on the JGP have clear gender mandates and recognise the centrality of gender work to the fulfilment of the equal rights of men and women, and the pursuit of all other human development goals – on poverty, education, health and HIV/AIDS, environment and climate change, etc.

(d) IP Mandates

With the exception of the Botswana Council of Churches (BCC), all CSOs IPs on the programme – Gender Links, Gender Perspectives, Kagisano Society Women's Shelter, Men & Boys for Gender Equality and Stepping Stones International (SSI) – have gender as their core

mandate. Though it does not have gender as its primary mandate, the BCC is a strategic entry point for work on gender equality. The Church in Botswana is a powerful but patriarchal institution, with women's participation in leadership in most churches limited by both tradition and edict. Therefore, successfully reorienting the attitudes of the clergy is potentially transformational because the church commands a large audience and has significant authority.

The other CSOSs have clear gender mandates. Gender Links is a gender focused NGO whose programme work on gender spans the areas of Governance, Media, Alliance Work, Gender Justice and Entrepreneurship. Its work on the JGP focussed on GBV and gender mainstreaming and targets communities, local government leadership and media as vehicles for positive gender transformation. As its name suggests, Kagisano Society Women's Shelter provides shelter and associated services to women victims of GBV. The focus of MBGE is GBV, with a bent towards raising the involvement of men and boys in issues of Sexual Reproductive Health and GBV. Gender Perspectives' core mandate is facilitating community transformation for gender equality and is, through the JGP, implementing a community based GBV prevention and mitigation initiative in two villages, Lerala and Maunatlala. SSI's core mandate is gender transformation. Through the JGP, it pursues transformation on GBV through a 10 point gender transformation tool that it has deployed in ten schools. So, from the perspective of the CSOS IPs and their partners in the UN and government, the JGP is very relevant to the mandates of CSOs implementing partners.

(e) Global goals, norms and standards

Both components of the JGP – mainstreaming and GBV- are inspired by global norms and standards. The mainstreaming component of the programme targeted strengthening gender processes and structures to facilitate gender mainstreaming, strengthening advocacy to raise the profile of gender on the national development

agenda, integrating gender into national laws, policies, plans, strategies and programmes, making health and HIV services more gender sensitive and expanding males' access to SRH, HIV/AIDS and TB services. These are direct contributions to the equality objectives of the Being Platform for Action, CEDAW and the call by both the MDGs (MDG 3) and the SDGs (SDG 5) for nations to promote gender equality and empower women and girls. By adopting the joint programme modality, UN agencies pursued the objectives of UN operational Reforms, more especially Delivering as One (DaO). Through these reforms, the cooperating UN agencies targeted raising the efficiency and effectiveness of the JGP and maximising the impact of their work on gender by improving interagency coordination, exploiting synergies, reducing overheads and lowering transaction costs.

Both components of the JGP – mainstreaming and GBV- are inspired by global norms and standards. The mainstreaming component of the programme targeted strengthening gender processes and structures to facilitate gender mainstreaming, advocacy to raise the profile of gender on the national development agenda, integrating gender into national laws, policies, plans, strategies and programmes, making health and HIV services more gender sensitive and expanding males' access to SRH, HIV/AIDS and TB services. These are direct contributions to MDG 3 and CEDAW.

Though the JGP is adjudged to be relevant in normative terms - and that goes for the programme as a whole and its individual components – there also is widespread recognition that the programme's relevance in terms of capacity to effect the change it targeted was considerably diminished by deficiencies in design. The programme was way too ambitious, lacked focus, had too many partners on both the UN and IP sides, was under funded, and the duration was too short for meaningful progress towards end results to be realised. In summary, there was a consequential disconnect between programme objectives (which are doubtless relevant) and the pathways to those objectives.

4.2 COHERENCE, SYNERGIES AND EFFICIENCY

"Assess the extent to which the joint gender programme created synergies, coherence and reduced transactional costs between and among the participating United Nations entities and partners"

As the GEJGP observes, "Coherence is central to the basic premise of joint programmes generally and joint gender programmes specifically. It is bound up with effects on synergies and efficiency and is core to the theory of change" (p 27). It is not possible for cooperating agencies and IPs, working together, to achieve results that are bigger than the simple sum of their individual contributions unless they achieve a significant degree of coherence at both the programming/design and implementation stages of the programme. The evaluation looked at coherence as consisting of two components, namely,

(a) *Internal coherence*: This aspect of coherence is concerned with the internal consistency of the programme. It addresses the question of whether the result chain reflects the causalities and complementarities necessary to achieve the target end results i.e., activities generate the desired outputs, the outputs complement each other and combine to generate the desired outcomes, which in turn complement each other and cumulate into the desired impact(s). It is also about the internal working arrangements such as the coordination of activities across implementing partners.

(b) *External coherence*: This dimension of coherence is concerned with how well planned programme results are aligned with the needs and priorities of the intended beneficiaries, the priorities and mandates of cooperating partners, as well as how well the objectives and implementation of the JGP relate to other policies, programmes and strategies with a bearing on gender empowerment, gender equality and GBV and global norms and standards on gender.

If coherence is achieved, synergies will be built between interventions, cooperating parties and implementing structures, efficiency gains will be realised and transaction costs will fall. The measurement of coherence is, however, quite subjective, based as it is on the subjective assessments of stakeholders.

Internal Coherence: The JGP did achieve some measure of internal coherence. First, there is some logical connectedness between individual agency outputs, JGP outputs and JGP outcomes. However, these links are weak, due mostly to weaknesses in programme design. The JGP outcomes, which were borrowed verbatim from the UNDAF/UNPOP, are quite broad. For instance, Outcome 1, **"Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights"** provides too broad an outcome for the achievement of seamless connection to the five outputs the gender based violence component was intended to contribute, namely:

Output 1.1: Gender Surveillance System for monitoring service provider preparedness established

Output 1.2: Monitoring and evaluation framework designed and implemented

Output 1.3: Enhanced participation in advocacy efforts to achieve the National Action Plan to end GBV's four goals

Output 1.4: Capacity on protocol and service standards for supporting survivors of GBV (inclusive of special provisions for children) built

Output 1.5: National interest in GBV research established

Whilst the outputs are mutually supportive, the outcome they support lacks the specificity necessary to establish strong causality between the JGP outputs and the outcome they support. Compounding the problem is a generally inadequate definition of results. Outputs 1.3 and 1.5 above are emblematic of this problem. Both outputs are weakly defined to the extent they lack specificity and measurability. The case for internal coherence and synergy is stronger with regard to working arrangements.

Within the UN, respondents spoke with conviction about how; (a) the limited expertise on gender within the UN was availed to the JGP for the benefit of all the cooperating agencies and IPs; (b) individual agencies brought their respective strengths together for the benefit of the programme, e.g., UNDP and UNICEF providing funding for outputs on which UNFPA led with technical expertise; UNAIDS contributing its expertise on HIV/AIDS related activities and outputs; (c) other NGOs benefitted from the media opportunities created by MBGE to carry out media advocacy and outreach in their own areas of work; (d) the UN built a strong and motivated Technical Working Group for the JGP; and (e), programme personnel learnt from each other and achieved appreciable levels of proficiency on gender.

External coherence: The results of the JGP are perfectly aligned with readily identifiable gender needs. None of the 21 outputs the programme targets is irrelevant to the core and urgent need to address gender iniquities, women's empowerment and GBV. In fact, the entire JGP lies squarely within the National Gender Programme. The results are also affirmatively aligned to national priorities as enunciated in key policy and planning documents, of immediate relevance being the NPGAD, NDP 10 and NDP 11. Alignment with the mandates of cooperating agencies and implementing partners is also self-evident.

The JGP also made significant contributions to both NDP 11 and Vision 2036, methodically integrating gender into both. NDP 11 and Vision 2036 are critical entry points for mainstreaming gender into development processes and generating awareness about gender and development within the wider community of development management practitioners in Botswana. The JGP is also aligned with the UNDAF and global norms and standards on gender. However, coherence would have improved considerably had JGP outcomes been introduced to provide a seamless link between JGP outputs and the much broader UNDAF Outcomes.

Lessons from the GEJGP

The synthesis report of the GEJGP shows that coherence does not just happen. It is fundamentally a product of programme design. The main drivers of coherence are summarised in Figure 3 below. The critical elements are a shared vision and common goals; a common identity; a shared vision and common goals; a common identity; a specific results area within the programme design for coordination and coherence; an experienced, technically capable and empowered coordination function; an engaged and informed Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team; stakeholder commitment to coordination and strong systems for mutual accountability amongst agencies

Figure 3: Drivers of Coherence

Source: Synthesis Report of the Global Evaluation of Joint Gender Progrmmes

To the credit of the JGP, it did specify in the gender mainstreaming component, a result area (output) dedicated to programme governance and coordination. Key PUNO outputs within this output are engaging a joint gender programme coordinator and administrative support; securing interagency consensus on a joint programme, developing a common gender mainstreaming policy for the UN agencies in Botswana, establishing a funding mechanism and integrating gender into all CCG plans and reporting mechanisms. A joint gender programme coordinator and consensus on the JGP were achieved. There is little evidence that the other PUNO outputs were realised. This, especially the lack of investment in administrative support, weakened the coordination function by burdening the programme coordinator with administrative work.

4.3 ACCOUNTABILITY

In this evaluation, accountability was conceived as having two essential dimensions: accountability for resources and accountability for results. The first dimension is concerned with the management and use of programme resources – money, people, equipment and materials – especially money. The second is concerned with accountability for results, i.e. whether mechanisms for ensuring that the cooperating agencies and their implementing partners are held accountable for the results they promised to deliver exist and are enforced. In the context of a

joint programme, this is an issue of mutual accountability.

The evaluation found that structures and systems for ensuring accountability were in place. In particular, the prodocs specify three essential structures for programme management, coordination and accountability. These are the Managing Agent, the Administrative Agent, the Joint Programme Coordinator and the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) which was referred to as the Joint Gender Programme Technical Working Group (JGPTWG).

❍ **Managing Agent:** The Managing Agent for the JGP is UNFPA. As the Managing Agent, UNFPA is responsible for the programmatic management and coordination of the JGP. UNFPA was selected for this role because it has comparative advantage and expertise in the areas of gender, sexual reproductive health and programming on women, youth and children.

❍ **Administrative Agent:** The Administrative Agent for the JGP as identified by the prodocs is UNDP. As the administrative agent, UNDP was given responsibility for the receipt, administration and timely distribution of resources from donors to implementing partners on behalf of the PUNOs. In the final analysis, no donor resources were received and this role was not activated. The PUNOs had not agreed on pooled funding and each agency administered its resources to the IPs it was supporting.

❍ **Joint Gender Programme Coordinator (JPC):** According to the JGP prodocs, this is a gender specialist who is responsible for the day to day management and coordination of the JGP. The Managing Agent provided the JPC, a gender specialist who coordinated programme implementation and the provision of technical support to IPs. Per the prodocs, the JPC's brief includes "… assessment of problems, designing interventions …, coordinating the monitoring of progress in achieving results …" as well as accountability for progress and financial reporting to the JGPTWG. The JPC was also expected to manage the relationship between

donors, cooperating agencies and the Government of Botswana. As stated in the prodocs, the JPC's mandate is expansive enough to merit resources beyond the one individual that the JGP ultimately provided. At a minimum, the JGP should have had a Programme Associate to work with the JPC to deliver on the operational aspects of programme coordination and accountability. Ideally, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) competence should also have been availed to the JPC function, preferably through stronger engagement of UN M&E specialists.

❍ **The Programme Steering Committee (PSC):** The PSC is the structure responsible for the overall coordination of the JGP. It consists of members of the Joint Gender Programme Technical Working Group (JGPTWG), which the prodocs describe as a team of gender experts from the GoB and participating UN agencies. In practice, the PSC also included representatives of participating CSOs. The JGPTWG is co-chaired by the UN and the GoB through GeAD. The GeAD chairpersonship is crucial to the extent it ensures government ownership and the location of the programme within the broader national vision on gender.

a) **Accountability for resources**

Stakeholders unanimously agreed that accountability for JGP resources was effective. UN systems and procedures for the management of, and accountability for, financial resources and equipment are in place, are robust and were strictly enforced. IPs that qualified to receive quarterly disbursements received them upon submission, review and approval by the JPC of the previous quarter's progress and financial reports. Those whose systems were considered inadequate and those who had failed to meet the strict requirements for the disbursements of funds had their procurement done directly from the UN.

b) **Accountability for results**

Effective accountability for results is crucial for the success of development programmes. Both components of the JGP had monitoring and

evaluation frameworks as well as the requisite accountability structures. These include the JPC, the JGPTWG, the PSC and the UNCT. These structures do monitor programme performance but their core functions are supporting implementation (JPC) and governance and oversight. The missing link is systematic monitoring as an exercise in verification, feedback, learning and accountability. The key accountability concerns were in the following areas:

i) *Monitoring and evaluation (M&E):* Though both components of the JGP had monitoring and evaluation frameworks and the requisite accountability structures, the programme had no systematic monitoring and evaluation. Though the UN has at least two M&E officers, the officers were not actively involved in the JGP implementation or the actual monitoring work. In the absence of effective programme monitoring, it is not possible to achieve adequate accountability for programme performance, identify and address problems timeously, initiate course correction measures where necessary and identify and document lessons.

ii) *Mutual accountability*: The synthesis report of the GEJGP outlines several criteria for ensuring mutual accountability. These include the creation of governance structures, the inclusion of national stakeholders within reporting structures, housing coordination units within the relevant government ministry/department, and RC and UNCT engagement. The relevant governance structures were in place. These include the JGPTWG at the JGP level and GoB-UN Programme Operational Plan (GoB-UNPOP structures to which all programmes and projects account, namely the Component Coordination Groups (CCGs) and the Steering Committee of the GoB-UN Programme Operational Plan.

These structure oversaw the implementation of the JGP. They held scheduled meetings at which they received and reviewed progress reports. In this sense, these forums provided opportunity for mutual accountability. Yet, respondents raised

concern that review meetings were overly focused on activities and financial reporting rather than results.

Moreover, stakeholder feedback suggests that GeAD also lacked the capacity to perform its role as an implementing partner and co-chair of the JGPTWG. On the UN side, the Resident Coordinator and the UNCT did receive regular reports on the JGP but there is scant evidence that either structure (RC or UNCT) actively acted to ensure mutual accountability between UN agencies or between the UN and the GoB. For instance, UN agencies were not held to account for failing to meet their commitments on the JGP by the UNCT. The fundamental weakness with respect to mutual accountability for results is the inadequate planning around mutual accountability at the design stage. Beyond the existence of governance structures, mutual accountability requires explicit focus at both the planning and implementation stages.

iii) *Leadership Engagement:* The UNCT in Botswana receives progress reports on the JGP at all its monthly meetings. In the words of one UNCT member, UNCT meetings are "prime space", and the JGP is the only programme that features on the agenda in all scheduled UNCT meetings. The RC and other members of the UNCT meet senior government officials regularly. Though their meetings are not necessarily to discuss gender, they nevertheless provide opportunity to discuss programmatic issues, including gender. When the UNDP Administrator visited Botswana in 2014, the RC and the UNCT used the opportunity to have her engage senior government leaders on gender.

The foregoing suggests strong leadership engagement on gender. Even so, feedback form respondents, especially programme personnel and IPs, suggests that there were areas where the leadership needed to have engaged more. In fact, one agency leader drew a contrast between the level of leadership engagement and enthusiasm during the design of the JGP and the level of engagement during implementation, noting that in the latter stage, the programme was mostly left

to programme personnel. As is observed in the GEJGP, "visible leadership" is necessary for a harmonised joint gender programme and for accountability for results. There was an expectation, unmet, that the top leadership should have been more visible in driving implementation and advocacy on gender, and engagement with existing and prospective partners.

iv) *Reporting*: Good reporting on programme performance contributes to accountability. It could also help mobilise resources and new partnerships for the programme. Implementing partners submit quarterly progress and financial reports for review and feedback by the relevant CCGs. The reporting could be improved in several respects. One is to focus more on results and less on activities. The reports generally focus on activities rather than results and are not prepared or designed to sensitise a wider constituency of stakeholders, including potential donors and partners who might respond to evidence of impactful work. Second, work done under the JGP and the results achieved could better feed into reporting and advocacy on gender at higher levels. CSOs IPs in particular have argued that government reports on gender, whether presented at national or international fora, generally reflect what the government does rather than the totality of gender related work done in Botswana.

The GEJGP offers instructive commentary on sources of weakness in mutual accountability. These are reproduced verbatim in Text Box 2 below. Some of these constraints on accountability apply to the Botswana context.

Box 2: Sources of weaknesses in accountability

1. Upwards lines of programme/staff reporting/financial management to entity headquarters, rather than lying in-country;

2. A lack of clarity or formalization around the role of the Resident Coordinator, with a less engaged individual failing to call entities to account – indicative that visible leadership, while critical, cannot be assumed for joint gender programmes;

3. A lack of tools/enforceable sanctions to check or prevent bilateral implementation, poor coherence or performance, overlap or duplication during implementation;

4. A lack of joint monitoring and reporting, with (in the main) a central focal point collating and presenting individual results reporting;

5. A lack of feedback loops to inform programme decision-making;

6. A lack of organizational incentives for coherence/ harmonization, and clear disincentives;

7. An emphasis on reporting for funding/activities, rather than reporting for results for gender equality (managing for development results); and

8. A lack of demand for accountability by partner governments116 and insufficient investment by joint gender programmes in systematically stimulating this demand, e.g. through strengthening of women's organizations/movements

Source: Synthesis Report of the Global Evaluation of the Joint Gender Progrmmes

4.4 SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS & VALUE ADDITION

This dimension of the evaluation answers two broad questions and associated sub-questions. The first question is: what happens post the JGP? It is essentially about whether project results will be sustained beyond the life of the JGP. To this end, the critical considerations include: (a) the presence, or lack thereof, of an exit and sustainability strategy to ensure that essential outputs are produced long enough for the intended outcomes and impacts to be realised and (b) the extent to which programme activities are integrated into the programmes and strategies of key partners such as the government to ensure that resources are available to sustain programme benefits. This is linked to whether there is sufficient ownership of, and commitment to, the programme by stakeholders with the means to sustain essential programme activities. The second dimension seeks to isolate those results/changes that could credibly be attributed to the JGP itself and the UN as a result of the programme. This would be determinable with relative ease at the output level, if outputs are properly defined, and in respect of capacity building. It would be difficult to ascertain at the outcome and impact levels because results above the output level typically require the input of more than any one party or programme. It is nonetheless necessary that value addition is assessed as accurately as possible at all levels of results.

a) Value Addition: Respondents unanimously agreed that the JGP produced some consequential results, mostly at the output level. Box 2 below summarises key JGP results based on the framework used by the Synthesis Report on the GEJGP.

Box 2: Overview of Key JGP Results Achieved

THEMATIC RESULTS
a) Advocacy on gender is strengthened across Botswana b) Communities in Lerala and Maunatlala empowered to recognise and respond positively to gender based violence, including reporting incidents c) Advocacy on gender is strengthened across Botswana d) Awareness and use of tools and methods for addressing gender and gender based violence expanded
REFORMING/STRENGTHENING THE POLICY, LEGISLATIVE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ENVIRONMENT FOR GENDER
a) Gender integrated into National Development Plan 11 and Vision 2036 b) Institutional capacity to mainstream gender into development processes strengthened in several government ministries and departments c) National policies and strategies on gender and GBV in place d) Enhanced political awareness of gender and gender-based violence at higher levels of decision making e) Strengthened and motivated UN Technical Working Group on gender f) Stronger coalitions for gender equality and the elimination of GBV built
STRENGTHENED DEMAND-SIDE FOR REFORM
a) Greater societal awareness of gender GBV and women's rights b) Greater networking and advocacy capacity among CSOSs working on gender. c) Strengthened national evidence base on gender issues

Source: JGP Progress Report

b) Sustainability

Each of the components of the JGP showed that some thought was given to the question of sustainability of results of the JGP at the programme planning/design stage. The strategy proposed by each of the components had three core elements:

❏ *Integrating gender issues into laws and policies*: Once gender is integrated into policies and laws, momentum for change is created in that the said laws and policies will regulate the behaviour of individuals and institutions beyond the life of the programme.

❏ *Changing attitudes at the "grass root" level*: A lot of the work done by CSOs such as Gender Links, Gender Perspectives, MBGE, Kagisano Society Women's Shelter and Stepping Stones International targeted durable change at the community or "grass root level". The expectation is that once the seed for change is planted, a self-sustaining momentum for positive change in attitudes, beliefs and behaviour on gender, women's empowerment and GBV is created to sustain change beyond the life of the programme.

❏ *Building the capacity of duty bearers*: Strengthening the awareness and delivery capacities of duty-bearers within government and CSOs positions them to drive transformation work on gender and to fulfil their obligations to rights-holders well beyond the life of the programme. For instance, councillors who achieve functional literacy on gender are likely to drive transformational work on gender beyond the life of the programme.

These elements constitute a credible theory of change and sustainability that with sufficient time and resources, effective programme design and execution, could produce and sustain transformational results on gender. In addition, the sustainability of the JGP results is further assured by several factors external to the programme. These include:

a) *Strong Government and CSOs commitment*: Both the government and CSOs are committed to the broader course of gender equality, women's empowerment and ending GBV as well as the specific results the programme pursued in these areas. In fact, the entire JGP is aligned to the National Gender Programme, whose priorities are supported by both the government and CSOs. The Government is committed to funding programmes on gender mainstreaming and gender based violence beyond the life of the JGP. CSOs are also motivated to continue work on gender and have generally planned for "life beyond the JGP". Their plans include mobilising resources from alternatives such as the European Union. Most CSOs reported having a diversified pool of funders.

b) *Strong commitment to the issues by the cooperating agencies*: Without exception, all the cooperating agencies identify the need for their continued engagement with issues of gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Their commitment is rooted in three compelling sources.

First, it is UN policy for all agencies and programmes to integrate gender equality into their work and to demonstrate results on gender.

Second, gender equality is widely acknowledged as a powerful enabler of progress towards results in other critical areas of development – poverty, education, health and HIV/AIDs, resilient communities, environment and climate change, governance, etc. Achieving gender parity in development is also a human rights imperative.

Finally, all the cooperating agencies find the magnitude of need on gender and GBV in Botswana compelling and are convinced that gender is an area in which the UN can make a difference, not only on gender but on other areas of human development. All the cooperating agencies believe a successor joint gender programme is necessary. They are also convinced that challenges to date notwithstanding, the joint gender programme approach is the best model for the UN to follow in order to make better use of its resources and magnify the impact of its work.

c) *Strong donor interest in gender*: Although the JGP did not quite achieve the objective of raising additional donor resources, gender remains one of the priority areas for many bilateral and multilateral development institutions. In fact, two of the biggest development institutions active in Botswana, the European Union and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, have prioritised gender in their programme work in Botswana. It is quite possible that with a more deliberate and strategic approach to resource mobilisation and partnership development, the UN and the GoB could broaden the coalition for gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls and the elimination of GBV in Botswana to include not only other development institutions but the private sector as well.

5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

There are two general conclusions to be made from this evaluation. First, the Joint Gender Programme has, as an approach to delivering programme services on gender, been very well received. Across stakeholders, its rationale and potential benefits - reduced transaction costs, maximising impact, harmonisation, better coordination and one amplified UN voice - were well understood and expectations were high that it would deliver to expectation. Second, whilst the JGP did produce some consequential results, it experienced challenges and fell short of expectation against the ambitious results it targeted. Inevitably, it would also have performance challenges against key evaluation dimensions. Below is a summary of key evaluation conclusions.

a) Achievement of results: The JGP delivered some significant outputs. It helped gender into NDP 11 and Vision 2036. These planning documents are powerful entry points for integrating gender into development processes. CSOs were also able to implement activities and produce noteworthy results. For instance, Gender Perspectives made considerable success in mobilising schools and communities against GBV in Lerala and Maunatlala. Stepping Stones International is successfully piloting its GBV transformation tool in schools in the Kgatleng district to create safe spaces within the school environment. Legal Aid Botswana has, in part because of the radio advocacy programme it undertook with the support of MBGE, seen a significant increase in the number of victims of GBV accessing its services. MBGE has mounted a successful advocacy programme on male involvement in eliminating GBV and improving access to SRH services for men and boys. Kagisano Society Women's Shelter expanded access to GBV services through a GBV sms-helpline, realising increased numbers of users every year. Gender Links did advocacy on gender work at local council level and provided empowerment services to women victims of GBV. The "I Stories" initiative documented women's experiences of GBV and empowered them socially and economically to start their income generating projects. The training of councillors that led to several councils adopting GBV action programmes is a stand out achievement.

However, the JGP fell short of delivering against the ambitious outputs it targeted within a short timeframe, 21 outputs in two years. The JGP's achievements are also, for the most part, isolated. They are not sufficiently aggregated towards the 21 key outputs the JGP prioritised. Thus, whilst the independent actions of implementing partners have made significant contributions in their areas of work, there is inadequate evidence of progress against most of the 21 JGP outputs, mostly associated with the weak monitoring framework.

b) Programme Design: Whilst the JGP was developed through a consultative process and was strongly aligned with national needs and priorities, the UNDAF and UN norms and standards, there is evidence that the partners under-invested in some critical dimensions of programme design. These have been discussed in detail in section 2.2 of this report. They include: (i) under-investment in capacity analysis, especially the systematic assessment of the capacities and readiness of GeAD as the fulcrum of the programme, and the readiness of PUNOs to work together under a joint gender programme; (ii) failure to reconcile the scale of the programme's ambition with the resources - human, financial and time - at its disposal; (iii) a wider focus (21 outputs), which limited the programme's capacity for impact; (iv) weak definition of results; and (v) inadequate profiling and mitigation of risks to the achievement of results.

As the GEJGP correctly observes, "The design process - far more than the resulting artefact of the programme document - is the foundation of a programme's ability to deliver its results". The defects in the design of the JGP compromised its performance.

c) Relevance: The JGP is quite relevant. It responds to government demand for support and for the UN agencies to work together in supporting gender work, expressed at the ministerial level. The extent of the programme's relevance is discussed in detail in Section 4.1 of this report, where it is pointed out that the programme's relevance is strongly affirmed at five levels, namely: response to evident national need; alignment with national priorities as articulated in national plans, the national vision and national policies and strategies; alignment to the mandates of implementing partners; alignment with the UNDAF; and alignment with international norms and standards such as CEDAW, the MDGs and the SDGs. The JGP scores a perfect score on relevance.

d) Coherence and Synergy: The JGP achieved some measure of internal and external coherence. There is a logical connectedness between individual agency outputs, JGP outputs and JGP outcomes which are UNDAF outcomes. However, these links are somewhat diminished by weaknesses in programme design. The outcomes, which were borrowed verbatim from the UNDAF/UNPOP are too broad to provide the necessary specificity in relation to the outputs of the JGP. For instance, Outcome 1, **"Effective and efficient service delivery for the fulfilment of human rights"** lacks the specificity necessary to establish causality between it and planned outputs. However, as per the programme design, the outputs themselves are generally mutually supportive.

Internal coherence and synergy are more apparent with regard to working arrangements. There is evidence that the limited expertise and experience on gender within the UN was used to the benefit of all the PUNOs and IPs and that individual agencies often brought their respective strengths together for the benefit of the programme, especially funding and expertise. The JGP also put together a strong and motivated JGP Technical Working Group that will serve programming on gender well in the future. NGOs worked together to expand the impact of their work, leveraging opportunities opened by others.

For instance, several CSOs exploited the media platforms created by MBGE to advance advocacy in their areas of work.

It is also quite evident that the results of the JGP are perfectly aligned with readily identifiable gender needs and national priorities as articulated in key national policies and plans. They are also strongly aligned to the mandates of individual PUNOs, CSOs implementing partners, the UNDAF and global norms and standards. In this regard, the programme did achieve an appreciable measure of external coherence. Regarding external coordination little was done under the JGP to link-up with initiatives by development institutions such as the European Union and USAID.

e) Accountability: By all accounts, the JGP excelled in terms of accountability for resources. The UN has good systems for the management of, and accountability for, programme resources and assets. These were strictly adhered to. However, the programme experienced challenges with regard to accountability for results. Monitoring was weak. There was no systematic approach to mutual accountability, with the result that PUNOs who failed to meet their obligations to the JGP were not held accountable.

f) Sustainability: Despite the challenges the JGP has had, there is strong evidence that the results it pursued shall be sustained. First, though not the most important driver of the JGP's sustainability, each of the JGP components has a narrative on three elements of sustainability, namely, integrating gender issues into laws and policies, changing attitudes at the "grass root" level and building the capacity of duty bearers. The downside to the strategy is that it is only realisable in the long term. The context in which the programme was implemented is, however, quite supportive to the sustainability of JGP results. It includes strong government and CSO commitment to gender, strong commitment to the issues by all PUNOs, and strong donor interest in gender. The Government is already committed to funding programmes on gender mainstreaming

and GBV beyond the 2015-2016 JGP cycle. CSOs are prepared to continue their work beyond the JGP. They are mobilising resources from alternative sources such as the EU. To most of them, JGP funding constituted only a small proportion of total funding. Furthermore, there strong commitment to gender among donors, mostly because they recognise that it is a powerful enabler for the achievement of results in all areas of development.

g) *Value Addition*: Notwithstanding the challenges it faced, the JGP did add value. It produced some consequential outputs as recorded in Box 1. It demonstrated that UN agencies can work together to pursue results on gender and advocate with one amplified voice. The programme has built a strong and active Technical Working Group and has laid the foundation for building a broad national coalition on gender. Through the JGP, CSOs partners that have hitherto worked independent of each other have used each other's strengths for the benefit of all. And there is significant room for improvement. Finally, by bringing stakeholders on gender to work together, the JGP has helped amplify advocacy on gender.

5.2   LESSONS LEARNED

The Joint Gender Programme is the first such initiative by the UN in Botswana. In this regard, it must be seen as an experiment/pilot from which lessons should be drawn on whether the UN can work better through joint programmes in general and joint gender programmes in particular, as well as what needs to change in order for the UN to work more effectively in the context of joint gender programmes. Experience with JGP offers a number of instructive lessons, key amongst these are:

a) *Gender remains a priority development challenge for Botswana*: The message from interviewees and documentary evidence is emphatic. Gender remains a priority development challenge for Botswana. Progress has been made in some areas, e.g. regulatory reforms and the representation of women in management positions, but gender inequality is still pervasive. It persists because it is a product of a culture of patriarchy and policies and laws with a history of discrimination against women. Despite progressive regulatory reforms, it will take time and effort to change the institutionalised culture of discrimination against women. The statistics on gender based violence also suggest it is a serious problem. So, an abiding lesson from the JGP is that the national need for action on gender is as strong as ever.

b) *Effective programme design has a decisive influence on programme performance*: This is also an important lesson from the GEJGP. Deficiencies in programme design have consequences for programme implementation and performance. In the specific case of the JGP, there are specific design issues that could have been handled better with potentially significant improvements in programme performance. They include:

❍ *Robust assessments*: A good situational analysis and a good capacity assessment. The 2014 Guidance Note on Joint Programmes is especially explicit on the issue of capacity assessments:

> In planning for a Joint Programme, the capacity and comparative advantages of the government, implementing partners and participating UN organizations to coordinate, manage and provide inputs (e.g., cash, supplies, in-kind or technical expertise) to support implementation and monitoring of the Joint Programme should be carefully considered. Where applicable, differences in methodology and approach – e.g. prioritization of areas and target population groups, methodology for community mobilization, modality of delivery of technical assistance – should be identified and resolved at the planning stage. For non-resident agencies, the Resident Coordinator should ensure their engagement in the process as needed in accord with their interests (p 9).

❍ *The scale of programme ambition should match the human, financial and time resources*: The scale of the JGP's ambition was way out of

sync with the limited resources – people, skills, money and time - available to the programme. This literally set the programme for under-achievement.

❍ *More thoughtful and purposeful selection of participating UN agencies and IPs*: The JGP had more UN agencies and CSOs than it needed. The selection of PUNOs should be strategic. The Guidance Note on Joint Programmes suggests as follows:

> The value-added contributions or comparative advantage of each agency should be considered by the UN Country Team, Resident Coordinator, national partner/s and donor/s. Participating UN Organizations (PUNOs) should be chosen only if they are essential for the successful implementation of the project and for producing the joint results and have the capacity for timely delivery of outputs of the Joint Programme. This may include adequate capacity of PUNOs to undertake results-based planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation (p 9).

This principle applies to the selection of IPs.

❍ *Clear definition of results is critical for programme performance*: Closer attention should be given to the definition of results in accordance with RBM taxonomy. SMART results facilitate implementation performance and monitoring and evaluation.

❍ *Greater clarity regarding the capacities of partners and the division of roles is critical*: A good capacity assessment should inform the ascription of roles on programmes and the mitigation of the capacity constraints of key role players. Thus, GeAD ought to be a major area of focus for programmes on gender, especially those sponsored by development agencies because aid effectiveness principles oblige them to strengthen the capacity of national institutions and work through them. It should also have been clear to all that the UN would not play the role of a donor on the JGP. It is also essential for a

government IP such as GeAD to fully appreciate its role and obligations on programme. The UN and other stakeholders are also obliged to recognise and support this role by a government department.

❍ *Clearer focus on key areas of performance is critical for programme performance*: A focus on results also requires a clear focus on key dimensions of programme performance at the design phase. Coherence, coordination, effectiveness, sustainability and mutual accountability do not just happen and cannot be assumed. They require deliberate planning.

c) *Clear focus on results and reporting is essential:* One of the critical weaknesses of the JGP was inadequate monitoring during its two years of implementation. This deprived the programme of essential feedback and learning and weakened accountability for results. Thus, a key lesson from the JGP is that monitoring should be systematically integrated into every stage of the programme as an exercise in verification, feedback, informing decision making and learning. This requires the engagement of M&E personnel from the design phase, through implementation to evaluation. Furthermore, it is essential that results are effectively communicated and reported as exercises in accountability, transparency, legitimisation and supporting the mobilisation of resources and partnerships.

d) *Systematic approach to accountability enhances programme harmonisation and performance*: As the GEJGP observes, "… accountability … should be integral to a joint gender programme …" (p 35). The UN has very robust mechanisms for accounting for resources. A similar level of focus on M&E and mutual accountability would strengthen programme quality and performance. Amongst the measures the GEJGP suggests are[8]:

❍ *The clarification and formalisation of the role of the Resident Coordinator*: The RC is one

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[8] In enunciating the measures, the report has extensively borrowed the text of the GEJGP

of the most critical partners for programme harmonisation and mutual accountability. Ideally, the RC should be more visible and engaged, with a clear focus on calling PUNOs to account.

❍ *Joint monitoring and reporting, with, a central focal point collating and presenting individual results*: To a significant extent, the JGP met this imperative, with a dedicated gender specialist serving as the joint programme coordinator. Even so, this one resource was not sufficient to cover the entire breadth of the coordination demands, especially monitoring.

❍ *Feedback loops to inform programme decision making*: This includes monitoring, reporting and active engagement, lateral and vertical, by senior people, notably the RC and the UNCT and their counterparts in government.

❍ *Investing in building "…demand for accountability by partner governments and CSOs"*: This would include strengthening programme governance and strengthening duty bearers such as women's organisations.

❍ *Shift in reporting towards results*: For the most part, IP reporting on the JGP was relatively strong with regard to financial resources and activities. Accountability would be strengthened by a shift towards reporting on results – outputs and progress towards outcomes.

The GEJGP makes the important point that part of what weakens mutual accountability is "… lack of organizational incentives for coherence/harmonization, and clear disincentives". An obvious obstruction to mutual accountability is the internal organisation of the UN, with all agencies reporting directly to their headquarters. Mutual accountability thus requires the RC to rely on soft assets to secure the commitment and accountability of PUNOs.

e) Stronger RC and UNCT engagement raises programme efficiency and effectiveness: Consistent with the GEJGP, the feedback from stakeholders suggests that one of the key lessons to be learned from the JGP is that the active and

visible engagement of the top leadership of the UN is critical to programme performance.

f) A robust and systematic approach to advocacy and communication: A systematic approach to communication and advocacy is essential for programme performance and accountability. The JGP could have used its products and tools more effectively to drive advocacy and to inform government accounting for work on gender. A programme such as the JGP requires a communication and advocacy strategy to communicate results, expose innovative solutions and tools to a wider audience, facilitate resource mobilisation and partnership development, and generally influence behavioural change at the community and institutional levels.

g) CSOs are strategic delivery mechanism for services on gender: The CSOs partners on the JGP have proved to be both innovative and effective in delivering gender related services. They not only reach places and constituencies the government is not always able to reach but they often also bring innovative approaches and products to bear on their engagement with communities and rights holders. Even so, and relative to the magnitude of need, CSOs has a limited footprint. This presents both an opportunity and a challenge. The challenge is that CSOs have limited capacity, compounded by the relative lack of donor interest in Botswana on account of its Middle Income Status. The opportunity lies in the fact that CSOs provides a potentially potent and efficient mechanism through which the government and development partners can expand the reach of gender related services. There is need therefore, for the government and development partners, especially the UN, to reflect on where and how CSOs could be used to more effectively deliver gender related programmes and services.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Below is a set of recommendations that follow from the conclusions and lessons learned from the implementation of the JGP.

Recommendation 1: A successor Joint Gender Programme should be developed

The case for a successor Joint Gender Programme is self-evident. The need is manifest in large gender disparities – on income and productive assets, political leadership, education etc. - and high rates of gender based violence. It demands a response from the government and its development partners, especially since gender equality enables both the achievement of other development goals and the fulfilment of the rights of women and girls. Other stakeholders, especially the government and CSOs, have demonstrated commitment to the end results the JGP sought.

Furthermore, the JGP results are strongly aligned with national priorities as well as the mandates of UN agencies and CSOs partners. All stakeholders thus agree that a successor JGP should be developed, with attention paid to the weaknesses that constrained the performance of the extant JGP. They desire a more focused, more coherent and realistic programme, with fewer players, a well-defined results architecture and better coordination.

Stakeholders agree that both gender mainstreaming and gender based violence require UN support. These areas are themselves quite broad. The parties to the new programme should avoid the temptation to address as many aspects of these areas as possible, be strategic and focus on areas their potential impact is significant. It may even be necessary for the UN to choose one of the two broad areas rather than work in both.

Recommendation 2: Invest in the delivery capacity of GeAD

The need to strengthen the delivery capacity of Government (particularly GeAD) and other implementing partners is urgent. A stronger GeAD will more effectively drive the national vision on gender and coordinate the national effort the JGP supports. Working under the leadership of a fit for purpose GeAD, the JGP could significantly improve on key dimensions of

programme performance, in particular coherence, efficiency, coordination, accountability (including monitoring and evaluation and reporting), and the mobilisation of resources and partnerships.

Capacitating GeAD should be approached as a shared responsibility between the GoB, the UN and other development partners. A strong and effective GeAD is perhaps the strongest measure of the GoB's commitment to development outcomes on gender. The primary challenge for the UN is to assist the GoB to identify the capacity challenges of GeAD and propose sustainable measures to address them. This would require a robust capacity assessment and strategic investments in GeAD's capacity based on the assessment, with a focus on key institutional competencies, e.g. coordination and monitoring and evaluation.

Recommendation 3: Invest Adequately in Programme Design

The performance of the JGP was constrained to a very significant extent by weakness in programme design. Should a successor programme be developed, more robust assessments will be necessary not only to more accurately define the need and propose responses but also to appreciate the capacity strengths and challenges of key stakeholders and develop appropriate mitigation measures. In particular, the successor programme will require deliberate planning for coherence and coordination at the design phase, a sharper focus on a core of strategic and synergised results, a clearer definition of results in accordance with Results Based Management (RBM) principles, and a smaller number of players on both the UN and IP sides based on robust criteria for inclusion as suggested by the Guidelines on Joint Programmes. The selection criteria should focus on the capacity and comparative advantages of agencies and IPs.

Coordination merits further clarification. At one level, what the programme needs is a competent and adequately resourced JGP coordination function. At a minimum it would require a gender

specialist and a programme associate with strong competencies in programme management and finance. Ideally, it should include a monitoring and evaluation competence. This could come through smart engagement of existing UN M&E personnel.

At another level, coordination requires the complete ownership of the programme by an appropriate national institution, e.g., GeAD taking ultimate responsibility for the performance of the programme and the achievement of results. The national vision on gender, to which the JGP objectives are subordinate, must drive the joint gender programme. GeAD should ensure that the programme is properly aligned with other national initiatives on gender and facilitate engagement amongst stakeholders.

Recommendation 4: Strengthen accountability systems

Future programmes should have clearer, more synergised and SMART results architectures from which adequate M&E frameworks are derived. It may be advisable to build the capacity on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for those who play key roles in programme design. In the specific case of a successor JGP, consideration should be given to creating JGP outcomes as another tier of results between the UNDAF Outcome and JGP outputs. This would mitigate the oddity of having UNDAF outcomes that are too broad in relation to JGP target outputs for causality to be clear.

Second, the successor programme should have a stronger design for mutual accountability. This should start with a more thoughtful and purposeful selection of cooperating UN agencies and IPs. It should not be enough for an agency or IP to express interest in the JGP or to merely have a mandate on gender. They should demonstrate clear and credible motivation and value addition. Furthermore systems must be in place to hold agencies and IPs accountable for their commitments on the JGP. The RC and the UNCT should thus adopt a more visible and active oversight role. Finally, care should be taken to

ensure that reporting on the JGP does not merely serve a compliance function but is strategic as well. Effective and strategic reporting on results is in fact advocacy and could help mobilise additional resources and partnerships for the programme.

Recommendation 5: Improve advocacy and communication

A programme such as the JGP requires a communications and advocacy plan, however basic. Such planning clarifies the purpose of communication and advocacy, identifies the audience, the most effective vehicles of advocacy and communication and the target outcomes. Advocacy is most powerful and real when it disseminates success, i.e. showcasing outstanding results and tools. Thus, in the successor programme, deliberate effort should be made to use programme results and tools to the extent possible for advocacy and to ensure that programme results are included in national level reporting on gender.

Advocacy is also most effective when an institution uses its best advocacy assets. For the UN and the Government of Botswana, the strongest advocacy assets are the RC and the UNCT on the UN side and the political leadership on the government side. Thus, it is critical that the RC, members of the UNCT, and ministers are more visible and engaged as advocates for the JGP's results, using a diversity of methods – public addresses, radio, television, social media and one on one engagements with key people in strategic institutions.

Recommendation 6: Stronger resource mobilisation

The joint gender programme did not do well on resource mobilisation. Part of the reason it struggled to mobilise resources may be Botswana's position as a middle income country. Another, and more likely, is lack of a focussed and strategic approach to resource mobilisation. Should a successor programme be developed, the challenge of resource mobilisation would still need to be met. As with advocacy, the

government could play a significant role in facilitating resource mobilisation for gender related work. Part of the strategy could include the government committing more of its own resources to the JGP and delivering more of its results through the programme to take advantage of the agility, efficiency and innovation of CSOs and to leverage government resources to attract resources from non-UN development partners and the private sector. This may require a more aggressive approach, including convening development partners' forums and national consultations (*PITSOs*) on gender and development.

Though the UN is not a donor, it has a duty to mobilise resources to fund its programmes and projects. The UN and the Government were the only sources of funding for the JGP. In a MIC context, government and the UN should also have been able to mobilise resources from non-traditional partners, including the private sector. So, mobilising resources from non-traditional partners should remain a priority goal for the UN in a successor JGP. Inadequate funding undermined the viability of the programme.

A successor JGP must have adequate funding for programme activities. This requires a systematic approach to resource mobilisation, engaging the RC, the UNCT and the government more effectively to mobilise resources and partnerships for the programme.

6.   SUCCESS STORIES

Several of the CSOs implementing partners submitted narratives sharing, in their own words and style, their success stories. These are presented hereunder, with minimal editorial input to preserve the authenticity of the stories. Editorial input has been limited to correcting for typographical errors and similarly minor corrections in order to preserve the authenticity of the stories.

6.1   Gender Links

Gender Links has been supported by UNFPA since 2013. In 2015, it was supported under the Joint Gender Programme. In the four years since, the Gender Links Botswana office has had many success stories it can attribute to the UN support. Gender Links is a small organisation with a large area of coverage. It has programs in a wide range of areas, including Governance, Media, Alliance Work, Gender Justice and Entrepreneurship.

Since it opened office in Botswana in 2008, Gender Links has relied on external donors to finance its initiatives. This has put the organisation at risk since Botswana is an upper middle income country and is by default not a priority for development assistance. UNFPA support was most opportune as the organisation did not have funds readily available for programme/project work. Through this support, Gender Links has grown from strength to strength. Pointing at one success story will not be sufficient, so we will therefore cite three examples.

1.   Empowering women survivors of GBV: The incidence of GBV is quite high in Botswana. Gender Links has chosen to contribute to the elimination of GBV by mobilising communities and leaders for action against GBV. Its primary targets being women survivors of GBV and councillors.

Gender Link has managed to reach 15 administrative councils around Botswana and identified 15 to 20 women survivors of GBV to work with. The main methods of assisting them are documenting their experiences and enrolling them on economic empowerment initiatives. Since 2013, and with the help of UNFPA, Gender Links has managed to produce three "I-Stories" booklets in which the women narrated their stories of abuse. The fourth production, done through the UN joint Gender Program and supported by UNDP, depicted the success stories of the women. The books have been supported by the ministry of Nationality, Immigration and Gender Affairs and several local media houses. Many have used the book to educate others on GBV. The books put a face to GBV and made Batswana appreciate the plight of survivors. Gender Links we have also learned a lot from this program. The women were empowerment economically and their lives improved substantially. The women have shown great appreciation for the trainings that they were given and have formed informal support groups.

2.   Mobilising and capacitating communities and leaders to Combat Gender Based Violence (GBV): In the past two years, the JGP has funded GL to train the local political leadership on Gender Based Violence in 15 administrative councils. The training equipped them to help GBV victims who come to them for assistance. In particular, it availed information on facilities and institutions to which they could refer GBV victims who came to them. The councillors became champion for the course of eradicating GBV in their respective communities. Through their leadership, several of the councils have GBV action plans

3.   Media Advocacy: Gender Links works with the media to capacitate journalists on gender sensitive reporting, reporting on gender generally and GBV in particular. Through the JGP, Gender Links has facilitated, with UN support, the development and printing of a Media Gender Policy.

6.2 GENDER PERSPECTIVES

Gender Perspectives was established in 2014 to facilitating community transformation for gender equality. The organization employs a two-pronged strategy as follows:

a) Information and knowledge strengthening through direct involvement in social development activities at all levels.

b) Stimulation for gender transformation at community level – working with communities as primary partners; to address identified gender related challenges, with the support of development players.

Gender Perspectives conceptualized a community based Gender Based Violence (GBV) Prevention and Mitigation Initiative (GBVPMI) to "… support the Lerala and Maunatlala communities to prevent and respond to gender based violence". The initiative had three activity/outcome areas, namely: (a) *Community level advocacy and capacity building activities*, with a focus on sensitisation, developing GBV facilitators and champions and tools and guides for facilitators; (b) *implementation of community based action oriented initiatives*, focussing on skills training for secondary school students in the two communities, creating active student GBV prevention clubs, and GBV monitoring tools; and (c*) School-based gender sensitization training for school staff*, targeting teachers with training and tools .

Since it started, the GBVPMI has, in association with the Botswana Police, sensitised 330 members of the community in the villages of Maunatlala (230) and Lerala (100) on GBV, trained 74 GBV facilitators and champions, 36 in Maunatlala and 38 in Lerala to drive GBV advocacy and action at the community and school levels; and equipped 355 students (157 in Maunatlala and 198 in Lerala) the confidence and skills to prevent GBV.

Although it is too early to assess the impact of the programme, there is evidence that it is already making a difference. To begin with, the GBVPMI has been well received in both Maunatlala and Lerala is credited with creating a better understanding of GBV and the capacity to detect and act on it. A facilitator and champion from the programme earned a medal during Botswana's 50th anniversary celebrations in recognition his contribution to GBV prevention in his community. The initiative has also attracted interest from other communities and has already made visits to four schools (a senior secondary school, two community junior secondary schools and a primary school) in four new communities. The programme is also building a network of strategic partners at the community level to drive the effort against GBV, with the Police, health clinics and local authorities coming on board and linking them with national service providers. Two cases were refereed Legal Aid in Gaborone in Gaborone and were successfully handled.

The single notable difference was made at Maunatlala Community Junior Secondary School, which had a history of student violence. Crediting the GBVPMI with bring change quickly, a facilitator observed this

> For the first time in a very long time Form 3 students wrote their final examinations without need for Police presence which was the case in the past. I can't think of any reason other than that the current Form 3 students underwent a character building training to enable them to make decisions that will pitch them as members of their community who are accountable and can take full responsibility for their actions. Actually, they learned during training that we each hold the golden key to our future!

The strength of the initiative lies in empowerment of both rights holders, mostly students and women, and duty bearers, e.g., the community, teachers, police, health personnel and councillors

6.3 Men and Boys for Gender Equality - "Men Care" - Fathers Groups Initiative

"Men care - Fathers Groups" is an initiative that mobilises and brings expectant & new fathers into the health care system as active and positive participants in the promotion of their own health, as well as that of their partners and children. Through a radio programme, "Men care" discusses sexual and reproductive health issues with both men and women on issues around parenting.

Highlights

- A successful launch of the programme in the district of Mahalapye and Shoshong on International Men's day.
- Successfully building relationships with stakeholders such as the Ministry of Health to facilitate recruitment through their register of expecting mothers. The register is used to invite fathers.
- Buy in of the community and village gate keepers such as dikgosi (chiefs), councillors and members of parliament.
- 200 men recruited and attending the 6 week programme.
- 27 fathers did HIV testing testing with their partners through the programme.
- Reaching out to farm workers in rural areas (farms) to participate in the 6 week programme.

Launch

- Fathers support partners during hospital check-ups and register in the "Men care" log book at the hospital.
- 150 fathers have graduated from the programme
- 23 fathers have undergone circumcision after finishing the programme
- 20 former participants have been trained to train others.
- A participant is facilitating consultation meetings in Otse village in Shoshong sub district

Graduation

Radio Programme

6.4   STEPPING STONES INTERNATIONAL (SSI)

Presentation of the 10 points for Gender transformation by Ithuteng C.J.S.S

Mochudi was full of life during the national launch of the 16 days of activism against violence on women and children, held at Mochudi Kgotla on 25 November 2016.

The launch handed Stepping Stones International an opportunity to present on the 10 points for gender transformation on making schools a gender sensitive environment. The presentation was made by Helen Kgwefane a student from Ithuteng CJ.S.S, one of the schools SSI has collaborated with to transform the learning environment into a Gender based Violence free zone.

After the presentation of the ten points by the students, subsequent speakers, including The Minister of Nationalities, Immigration and Gender affairs, as well as representatives from UN Women and PEPFAR, referenced to the 10 points on gender transformation which resonated well with the audience. The magnitude of the national launch, with all its media coverage, shone a light on the efforts of the UN Joint gender program in Kgatleng and the success it has achieved due to collaboration with other service providers. The program has cemented relations between SSI and other service providers. This relation will go a long way in sustaining current and future projects and programmes implemented by SSI and/or its development partners.

The development of the 10 points for gender transformation has also unearthed talent, with students from Sedibelo C.J.S.S composing a song that speaks out against Gender based Violence. The song was also performed during the National launch. SSI has offered to help the students pursue their dream of having the song released and playing on radio stations. SSI will also introduce the song to the UN Joint gender programme partners to seek for support to the students and its possible benefit of it to future programs.

ANNEX 1: LIST OF COOPERATING UN AGENCIES

1.	UNAIDS - Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
2.	UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
3.	UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
4.	UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund
5.	UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
6.	UNICEF - United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
7.	UN WOMEN -United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
8.	ILO - International Labour Organisation
9.	WHO - World Health Organization

ANNEX 2: LIST OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

	IMPLEMENTING PARTNER	2015	2016
1.	Gender Affairs Department (GeAD)	X	X
2.	Gender Links	X	X
3.	Kagisano Society Women's Shelter	X	X
4.	Botswana Council of Churches	X	X
5.	Men & Boys for Gender Equality	X	X
6.	Stepping Stones International	X	X
7.	Legal Aid Botswana	X	X
8.	Gender Perspectives	X	X
9.	Botswana Police Service (once-off financial & technical support, can be left out of interviews)	X	
10.	Ministry of Health (once-off technical support)		X
11.	THC Foundation (once-off financial & technical support)		X
12.	Putting Women First Trust (once-off financial & technical support)		X

ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT – <u>UN PROGRAMME PERSONNEL</u>

EVALUATON OF THE JOINT PROGRAMMES ON GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

a) COHERENCE

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

1. The components (activities and results) of the JGP programme are internally consistent, i.e., activities complement each other and lower level results are logically and causally linked to higher level results.

5. Strongly Agree	4. Agree	3. Don't Know	2. Disagree	1. Strongly Disagree

Please Explain:

2. The results of the JGP programme are strongly aligned to the objectives/priorities of the Government of Botswana and the mandates of cooperating agencies

5. Strongly Agree	4.Agree	3.Don't Know	2.Disagree	1.Strongly Disagree

Please Explain:

3. Cooperating agencies are realising synergies at all levels of the programme cycle

5.Strongly Agree	4.Agree	3.Don't Know	2.Disagree	1.Strongly Disagree

Please Explain:

4. The JGP priorities and implementation are harmonised with those of other policies, strategies and programmes pursuing similar objectives

5.Strongly Agree	4.Agree	3.Don't Know	2.Disagree	1.Strongly Disagree

Please Explain:

b) EFFICIENCY

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

1.	The cooperating parties have gained appreciable efficiency gains by working together, i.e., results are being achieved at a lower costs than would otherwise have been the case				
5. Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

2.	By working together, each of the cooperating agencies has gained access to efficiency enhancing resources it would otherwise not have had				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

3.	Each of the cooperating agencies has achieved more as a results of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

4.	There are no more economical ways in which the JGP could have achieved the results it produced				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

C. SUSTAINABILITY

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strongly agree, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

5. There is sufficient government and CSOs ownership of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

6. JGP priorities and activities are adequately integrated into the policies, strategies and programmes of the government and other key stakeholders with the capacity to sustain them				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

7. The JGP has a clear exit strategy				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

8. The cooperating partners to the JGP are committed to pursuing JGP objectives beyond the life of the programme				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d) ACCOUNTABILITY

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

a. The JGP had all the necessary structures for effective programme governance				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b. The implementation of the JGP was effectively monitored throughout the programme cycle				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c. There has been accurate and effective accounting for the resources and results of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d. Reporting on the performance of the JGP has been adequate				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

e) VALUE ADDITION

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

a. Botswana has achieved significant results on women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence that it could not have been achieved without the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b. The JGP has mobilised new partnerships towards the cause of women's empowerment, gender equality and the eradication of gender based violence.				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c. There are more resources for women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence as a result of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d. There are significant policy and strategy reforms on women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence as a result of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

Please, share your impressions on each of the following;

1. The management arrangements of the JGP and their efficacy

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2. The main achievements of the JGP

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3. The main challenges of the JGP

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4. Missed opportunities

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5. Your suggestions for improvements on programming on women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence.

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ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT – IP FOCAL POINTS

EVALUATON OF THE JOINT PROGRAMMES ON GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

a)   COHERENCE

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

a. The components (activities and results) of the JGP programme are internally consistent, i.e., activities complement each other and lower level results are logically and causally linked to higher level results.				
5. Strongly Agree	**4. Agree**	**3. Don't Know**	**2. Disagree**	**1. Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b. The results of the JGP programme are strongly aligned to the objectives/priorities of the Government of Botswana and those of my organisation				
5. Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c. My organisation is realising appreciable synergies at all levels of the programme cycle				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d. The JGP priorities and implementation are harmonised with those of other policies, strategies and programmes pursuing similar objectives				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b) EFFICIENCY

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

a. My organisation has realised appreciable efficiency gains by working with others on the JGP, i.e., results are being achieved at a lower costs than would otherwise have been the case				
5. Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b. As a result of the JGP, my organisation has gained access access to efficiency enhancing resources it would otherwise not have had				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c. My organisation has achieved more on gender by working within the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d. There are no more economical ways through which the JGP could have achieved the results it produced				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c) SUSTAINABILITY

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strongly agree, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

e. There is sufficient government and CSOs ownership of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

f. JGP priorities and activities are adequately integrated into the policies, strategies and programmes of the government and other key stakeholders with the capacity to sustain them				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

g. The JGP has a clear exit strategy				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

h. The cooperating partners to the JGP are committed to pursuing JGP objectives beyond the life of the programme				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d) ACCOUNTABILITY

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

a. The JGP had all the necessary structures for effective programme governance				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b. The implementation of the JGP was effectively monitored throughout the programme cycle				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c. There has been accurate and effective accounting for the resources and results of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d. Reporting on the performance of the JGP has been adequate				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

e) VALUE ADDITION

On a scale of 1-5, five representing strong agreement, rank the JGP on each of the following attributes.

a. Botswana has achieved significant results on women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence that it could not have been achieved without the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

b. The JGP has mobilised new partnerships towards the cause of women's empowerment, gender equality and the eradication of gender based violence.				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

c. There are more resources for women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence as a result of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

d. There are significant policy and strategy reforms on women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence as a result of the JGP				
5.Strongly Agree	**4.Agree**	**3.Don't Know**	**2.Disagree**	**1.Strongly Disagree**
Please Explain:				

Please, share your impressions on each of the following;

1. The management arrangements of the JGP and their efficacy

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2. The main achievements of the JGP

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3. The main challenges of the JGP

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4. Missed opportunities

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5. Your suggestions for improvements on programming on women's empowerment, gender equality and gender based violence.

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ANNEX 4: Focus Group Discussion Guide

1. What are your views on the Joint Gender Programme?

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2. Looking back at your experience with the beneficiaries of the JGP, what do you think are their views of the JGP?

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3. Looking back at the time the programme was designed, what do you think was done right? What was not done right?

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4. Reflect on the challenges and opportunities the JGP faced during its two years of implementation

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5. Overall, what are the key lessons to be learned from Joint Gender Programme?

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6. If you had an opportunity talk to the UNCT about the JGP, what would you say?

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ANNEX 5: Interview Guide – <u>Management</u>

1.   Why, in the first place, did your agency decide to undertake programme work on gender, and more specifically gender mainstreaming and gender based violence?
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2.   When you decided to undertake programme work on gender, what were the priority end results you envisaged? i.e., the kind of impacts you saw your programme having and why?
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3.   What motivated your organisation's decision to partner with other agencies to pursue the results you prioritised on gender?
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4.   In your view, how did the joint gender programme perform during its two years of implementation?

   - Key achievements
   - Challenges
   - How challenges were overcome
   - Opportunities opened

5.   Did the joint programme modality deliver the benefits you envisaged on the JGP? Please explain?
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6.   What are the instructive lessons you take away from your experience with the JGP, both on gender and on the joint programme modality?
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7.   Any concluding observations?
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ANNEX 6: List of documents consulted

1. Botswana Core Welfare Indicator Survey
2. Botswana: Millennium Development Goals Report 2015
3. Botswana UN Joint Programme on Gender Based Violence - 2016Annual Work Plan
4. Botswana UN Joint Programme on Gender Mainstreaming – 2016 Annual Work Plan
5. Botswana UN Joint Programmes on Gender Mainstreaming and Gender-Based Violence: Annual Progress Report - 2015
6. Botswana UN Joint Programmes on Gender Mainstreaming and Gender-Based Violence: Annual Progress Report - 2016

7. Final Evaluation of the United Nations Joint Programme for Gender Equality in Uganda, 2015

8. Government of Botswana United Nations Programme Operational Plan (2010-2014)

9. Gender Equality Policy, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

10. Joint Evaluation of Joint Programmes on Gender Equality in the United Nations System Final Synthesis Report, November 2013

11. Joint Evaluation of Joint Programmes on Gender Equality in the United Nations System – Summary Case Study Report, Kenya Joint Programme on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, 2013

12. Joint Evaluation of Joint Programmes on Gender Equality in the United Nations System – Summary Case Study Report, Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Liberia, 2013

13. Joint Evaluation of Joint Programmes on Gender Equality in the United Nations System – Summary Case Study Report, Joint Programme for Support to the Implementation of the National Strategy for Gender Equality and Domestic Violence, 2013: Advancing Democratic Governance in Albania

14. Long Term Vision for Botswana – Towards Prosperity for All

15. The gender Joint Programme in Namibia, Final Evaluation Report, 2012

16. UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2014-2017

17. United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Botswana (2010-2016)

18. UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Gender Programmes, 2014

19. United Nations Joint Programme of Support for Gender Mainstreaming: 2015-2016 – Programme Document

20. United Nations Joint Programme of Support to End Gender Based Violence: 2015-2016 – Programme Document

21. WORKING FOR AN EQUAL FUTURE: UNICEF Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Girls and Women